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Abstract
Non-tax legal rules regulating the workplace, the 6inancial sector, real property,
and many other areas affect the ability of governments to collect revenues and
provide public goods. Yet tax-collection considerations rarely enter into economic
analyses of non-tax legal rules. Usually, tax-collection concerns are shunted aside to
separate studies (and separate law-school courses) rather than being integrated
into debates in non-tax spheres. This separation between non-tax legal rules and taxcollection considerations bears signi6icant negative consequences for the ability of
law and economics to generate descriptively accurate and normatively attractive
accounts of important non-tax legal questions.
This Article takes a step toward remedying that oversight. We present an
analytic framework for understanding the interaction between non-tax legal rules
and tax collection. This framework—which we call the Legal Envelope Theorem—
demonstrates that legal rules should systematically deviate from simple notions of
ef6iciency to take stock of tax effects. We then provide a series of examples applying
the Legal Envelope Theorem, illustrating how the non-tax legal system ought to be
(and, on occasion, actually is) designed with tax effects in mind. These examples
range from parental-leave mandates to bank capital requirements to centuries-old
property and contract rules regularly taught in introductory law-school courses. We
illustrate how a framework that is attentive to tax-collection considerations can
enhance the government’s capacity to redistribute resources and address wealth
inequality.
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INTRODUCTION
As late as the second half of the nineteenth century, communities in many
parts of Europe organized landholdings in ways that would look strange to
modern eyes. In parts of rural Russia, for example, a household might, in the
summer, hold a dozen or so noncontiguous strips of land in different ecological
zones surrounding a single village. In the winter, the cropland might revert to
commonly owned property where anyone could graze their fowl and livestock.
These arrangements, writes James C. Scott in his book Seeing Like a State, were
well understood by local inhabitants and “worked admirably for their
purposes.”1 But property rights regimes of this sort created problems for tax
collectors, who faced tremendous difKiculties in assigning liabilities to different
households.
On Scott’s account, authorities in several countries responded to this
challenge by modifying property regimes so as to make landholdings more
“legible,” i.e., more susceptible to observation and taxation. In many places,
authorities replaced well-functioning but illegible regimes with freehold
tenure systems that facilitated the collection of revenues. Legal rules
governing real property were devised with taxation in mind, and
arrangements that might have been otherwise optimal were instead modiKied
in light of tax considerations.2
In Scott’s view, legibility is a double-edged sword. Efforts to facilitate
observation and taxation are “vital to the maintenance of our welfare and
freedom,”3 for a state unable to collect revenue from its citizens is also unable
to protect and advance their interests. But, Scott warns, “the legibility of

JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN
CONDITION HAVE FAILED NO (QRRS).
2 We are not sure that this claim is the best description of the reasons for the shift to
freehold tenure. There may have been other advantages to freehold tenure. Our focus is on
modern examples, and nothing in our analysis depends on whether Scott’s account is accurate.
3 SCOTT, supra note Q, at N.
1
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society provides the capacity for large-scale social engineering,”4 and it is thus
a necessary (though not sufKicient) ingredient in many of the greatest tragedies
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Scott’s account of efforts at legibility
is thus not entirely—or primarily—valedictory. After all, the same features that
allow a state to raise revenue likewise enable it to suppress minorities (and
sometimes majorities).
While Scott is focused on the relationship between legibility and tyranny,
his account also suggests a close relationship between legibility—the ability of
the government to observe and tax—and legal rules. For a state to revise its
entire system of property law to facilitate tax collection is exceptional, but the
idea that property law might be designed with a view toward taxation is not.
Legal rules seemingly unrelated to taxation—such as the statute of frauds—
have their historical origins in debates over tax-collection capacity. Legal rules
engineered for non-tax purposes—from parental leave laws to bank capital
requirements—potentially serve important tax-facilitating functions.
Understanding the idea of legibility and the relationship between non-tax
rules and tax collection is essential to understanding why our current legal
system looks and works the way it does.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between taxes and legal rules.
We seek to understand whether—and under what circumstances—non-tax
legal rules have been or should be adjusted to take the tax system into
account.5 We will argue that there are a small number of cases in which wellknown non-tax legal doctrines do reKlect tax collection considerations, and a
larger number of cases in which they ought to. In this latter bucket, we place
(among others) many legal rules governing the workplace, the structure of
business organizations, the Kinancial sector, and the transfer of real property.

Id. at W.
As the large literature on tax expenditures argues, the line between tax and non-tax
legal rules is to a great extent arbitrary. Nothing in our paper turns on this distinction. In fact,
our thesis is that there should be less of a distinction between tax and other legal rules.
4
5
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In all of these cases, non-tax legal rules affect tax collection, and the non-tax
legal regime ought to be adjusted in light of this phenomenon.
To advance our thesis, we develop a theoretical apparatus for
understanding the interaction of legal rules and the tax system, resulting in
what we call the Legal Envelope Theorem. The Legal Envelope Theorem builds
on a narrower instrument that we introduced in prior work on tax policy. That
tool—which we called the Behavioral Elasticity of Tax Revenue, or BETR—is a
measure of the efKiciency effects of a small tax policy change. It allows us to
estimate the effects on total resources available to society of almost any
modiKication to tax policy, including changes in tax rates, the tax base, or tax
enforcement.
Our fundamental insight is that non-tax legal rules affect the total
resources available to society through the same channels as tax policy does.
For example, changes to workplace rules may make labor in the formal (taxed)
sector relatively more attractive than leisure or work in untaxed sectors of the
economy, such as household production. As a result of a change in relative
value, people will shift toward working more in the formal sector and paying
more in taxes. Likewise, legal rules can make activities relatively easier for the
government to observe and thus to tax. For example, the Uniform Commercial
Code’s statute of frauds—which requires contracts for the sale of goods
totaling XY,, or more to be indicated in writing6—potentially makes it easier
for tax authorities to Kind evidence of unreported income. Scott’s example of
early-modern European property rules, which enhanced the legibility of land
holdings, Kits this latter logic.7
To analyze how non-tax legal rules affect total resources, we rely on the
envelope theorem—familiar to many readers from basic microeconomics. The

6

U.C.C. § Z-ZOQ (Unif. Law Comm’n ZOQZ).

7 These two pathways are not distinct. Activities that the government cannot observe are

likely to be in the informal sector. Making activities more observable may often be the same
thing as shifting activities to the formal sector. Nothing except nomenclature depends on the
distinction. Instead, it is, we hope, a helpful way of organizing cases.
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envelope theorem holds that a slight change in the value of one parameter has
no Kirst-order effect on the optimized value of a function. For example, if an
individual allocates her time between labor and leisure in a way that is
privately optimal, a small shift toward more labor or more leisure does not
make her materially better or worse off. The reason for this is at the optimum,
the marginal beneKit to the individual from working a little more is equal to the
marginal cost (in this example, the opportunity cost of losing a little bit of
leisure time). If it were otherwise (i.e., if the marginal beneKit were greater than
the marginal cost or vice versa), the individual would reallocate her time
between labor and leisure until she reached a point at which there were no
additional incremental gains to be had.
Applying the envelope theorem to the interaction of legal rules and the tax
system yields a powerful conclusion: If we start from the point at which the
marginal non-tax beneKit of adjusting a legal rule in one direction or the other
equals the marginal non-tax cost, but the tax consequences of the change are
more than marginal, then we can potentially achieve Kirst-order (i.e., more than
marginal) tax system beneKits without material non-tax costs. Better yet, the
BETR—which measures the efKiciency effects of small changes in the tax
system—allows us to determine how far from the non-tax optimum to deviate
in light of tax collection considerations. In other words, it tells us how far from
“simple efKiciency” we want our legal rules to be (where by “simple efKiciency,”
we refer to the maximization of non-tax beneKits net of non-tax costs).
Having established the Legal Envelope Theorem as a conceptual manner,
we then illustrate its practical applications. Across a wide array of doctrinal
areas, we highlight important interactions between legal rules and the tax
system. We show how the Legal Envelope Theorem can inform the design of
core legal rules, including laws affecting work, the law of business
organizations, laws affecting size of the informal sector, and property law.
The Legal Envelope Theorem also sheds light on long-running debates in
law and economics regarding the relationship between efKiciency and
distribution. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have argued that legal rules
should not be adjusted to favor the poor, because “such use of legal rules to
redistribute income is generally less effective than relying exclusively on the
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income tax system to achieve distributive objectives.”8 Our analysis—though
compatible with a careful reading of Kaplow and Shavell’s argument—adds an
important qualiKication. The ability of the tax system to achieve redistributive
objectives depends critically on the design of non-tax legal rules. When nontax legal rules are structured so as to make the tax system function more
effectively, the efKiciency costs of redistributive taxes will be lower, and the
optimal level of redistribution will be higher.
This last insight connects the Legal Envelope Theorem to conversations
about widening wealth and income inequality, which former President Barack
Obama has described as “the deKining challenge of our time.”9 The failure of
non-tax legal rules to account for tax collection consequences makes the
challenge of wealth and income inequality even greater, because it renders
efforts to address that challenge through the tax-and-transfer system costlier.
Although our statement of the Legal Envelope Theorem does not explicitly
account for redistribution (and, indeed, we agree with Kaplow and Shavell that
non-tax legal rules generally are not the most efKicient means of achieving
purely redistributive objectives), the primary underlying motivation for the
Legal Envelope Theorem is to facilitate redistributive taxation. If society did
not care at all about redistribution, it would not need the Legal Envelope

Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of
Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, ZR J. LEGAL STUD. SZQ, S^N (ZOOO)
[hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules]. For earlier statements of the argument,
see Steven Shavell, A Note of EfDiciency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should
Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, aQ AM. ECON. REV. NQN (QRSQ);
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less EfDicient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, Z^ J. LEGAL STUD. dda (QRRN) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Why the
Legal System].
9 White House Ofeice of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility
(Dec.
N,
ZOQ^),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressofeice/ZOQ^/QZ/ON/remarks-president-economic-mobility.
8
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Theorem.10 Because we do care about redistribution, the addition of the Legal
Envelope Theorem to the toolkit of legal-system design is imperative.
We proceed as follows. Part I provides the analytic underpinnings of the
Legal Envelope Theorem. It begins with our prior measure of the effects of
changes to the tax system, the BETR. It then shows how the BETR can be
extended to capture changes to legal rules. It also situates the Legal Envelope
Theorem within the broader law-and-economics and public Kinance
literatures. Part II shows how the Legal Envelope Theorem applies to four
different areas of law: laws that affect work, the law of business organizations,
laws that affect the size of the informal sector, and property law. In each case,
we consider a number of different legal rules, showing how reforms should be
evaluated in light of their interactions with the tax system. We conclude with
reKlections on the role of the Legal Envelope Theorem in scholarly and policyreform debates.
I. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
In prior work, we developed a measure of the efKiciency effects of changes
in tax policies, such as changes to tax rates, the tax base, or enforcement
efforts.11 We show here that this measure—the Behavioral Elasticity of Tax
Revenue, or BETR—also allows us to estimate the efKiciency consequences of
changes to legal rules that affect tax collection. Building on this foundation, we
establish the Legal Envelope Theorem. The Legal Envelope Theorem holds that
it is optimal to deviate from an otherwise efKicient legal rule if the BETR from
the change is positive. Although the strong form of the Legal Envelope

Absent any concern regarding redistribution, the most efeicient mechanism for raising
revenue is a lump-sum tax (i.e., a tax that does not depend upon income). The decision instead
to use taxes that depend upon income, consumption, and wealth—which, in turn, gives rise to
the distortions that the Legal Envelope Theorem addresses—is a decision that reelects
society’s distributional concerns.
11 Daniel Hemel & David Weisbach, The Behavioral Elasticity of Tax Revenue (Univ. of Chi.
Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. SRZ, Oct. ZOQR),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=^NdZaOW. A more complete explanation of the BETR is found in
that article.
10
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Theorem applies only to marginal (i.e., small) changes to legal rules, the same
framework also sheds light on larger legal-system reforms.
Our motivating example in the next two sections involves a
straightforward tradeoff between two activities—raising cattle for sale in the
taxable sector versus growing vegetables for consumption in the untaxed
sector. Many readers will recognize this rancher-grower example from Ronald
Coase’s canonical article The Problem of Social Cost,12 almost certainly the most
inKluential single article in the law and economics literature. The difference
between Coase’s example and ours is that Coase considers the allocation of
land between two people engaged in different activities—a rancher who raises
cattle and a farmer who grows vegetables. We begin by considering cases in
which the same individual engages in different activities (cattle raising and
vegetable growing) and allocates land between those two activities. Later on,
we will extend our analysis to multi-actor settings that are closer to Coase’s.
While we thus take some liberties with Coase’s example, the correspondence
to Coase is intentional. We seek to show how the Legal Envelope Theorem
informs central problems in law and economics, as well as other areas.
A.

The Behavioral Elasticity of Tax Revenue
_. Market vs. Non-Market Production

Consider, Kirst, a very simple setting in which a single individual is
choosing between two potential uses of the same plot of land. The individual
can (a) use the land to raise cattle, which she then will sell at a cattle market in
a transaction observable by the tax authority, or (b) use the land to grow
vegetables, which she and her family then will consume. Her choice need not
be all-or-nothing: she can split the land between the two uses.
The individual makes this choice against the backdrop of a tax system. For
purposes of the example, we will assume a very simple tax system consisting
only of a Klat-rate `, percent cash Klow income tax. We also will assume, as is

12

Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, ^ J. L. & ECON. Q (QRdO).
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standard, that the cash Klow income tax does not reach household production
and consumption. The government does not tax—because it has no way of
observing—the value of goods and services that an individual produces for
herself and her household members (e.g., vegetables from one’s own garden).
The individual will want to allocate her available land between cattle
raising and vegetable growing such that the value she derives from an
additional unit of land devoted to cattle raising equals the value she derives
from an additional unit of land given over to gardening. If one of those values
were greater than the other, she would reallocate land to the higher-value use
until there were no more incremental gains to be had.13
Let’s say that, at the private optimum, an additional unit of land devoted
to cattle raising will allow the individual to earn an additional X_, at the cattle
market. She then will have to pay a tax of `, percent x X_,, or X`, leaving her
with Xa with which she can buy goods and services. Since the individual is
optimizing, this implies that the value of the vegetables that the individual can
grow by devoting the same unit of land to vegetable growing is also Xa. If it
were anything more than Xa, she would want to reallocate land from cattle
raising to vegetable growing (and vice versa if it were less than Xa).
Now suppose that the tax rate falls from `, percent to inKinitesimally less
than `, percent, such that the after-tax amount that the individual can earn
from devoting an additional unit of land to cattle raising is slightly more than
Xa. The individual will reallocate a little bit of land from vegetable growing to
cattle raising because cattle raising is now slightly more valuable to the
individual than it was before.

We will assume, for purposes of this article, that the individual chooses the privately
optimal allocation (i.e., what’s best for her and her family). The BETR and the Legal Envelope
Theorem can be extended to individuals who make optimization errors following the
approach outlined in Raj Chetty, Is the Taxable Income Elasticity SufDicient to Calculate
Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance, Q AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y ^Q, ^R–
NQ (ZOOR).
13
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What is the effect of this change on the individual’s wellbeing? If she
devotes one more unit of land to cattle raising and one fewer to vegetable
growing, she is not materially better or worse off than before, because she was
previously indifferent between those two options. A small change in the tax
rate causes her to shift her choices, but that shift itself has approximately zero
effect on the individual’s utility. True, when she earns an additional X_, at the
cattle market, she pays an additional tax of almost X`, but she is approximately
as well off as if she had spared herself the X` in taxes and grown vegetables
worth Xa (indeed, slightly better off). This result follows from what is known
in economics as the envelope theorem.14 Envelope effects are a key part of the
arguments that follow.
While the individual is roughly indifferent as to whether she allocates an
additional unit of land to cattle raising and pays X` more in taxes, society is
not. Society is X` better off when the individual allocates the extra land to cattle
raising, because the individual’s income from cattle raising is taxed while the
value of vegetables grown for home consumption is not. Thus, the government
raises an additional X` of revenue and can purchase an additional X` of public
goods. This X` of revenue is the tax equivalent of manna from heaven—it’s X`
of extra wealth to be allocated across society. We will refer to it as the
“behavioral” effect on tax revenue—“behavioral” because it resulted from a
change in the behavior of a taxpayer (here, the individual allocating more of
her land to cattle raising).
The X` behavioral effect on tax revenue from the individual reallocating
land to cattle raising is not the only consequence of a slight reduction in the

Why exactly it carries that name requires a longer explanation. On the history of the
envelope theorem, see Torsten Schmidt, Really Pushing the Envelope: Early Use of the Envelope
Theorem by Auspitz and Lieben, ^d HIST. POL. ECON. QO^ (ZOON).
Envelope-theorem reasoning appears at several places in the law-review literature. See,
e.g., Ian Ayres, Pushing the Envelope: Antitrust Implications of the Envelope Theorem, Qa MISS.
C. L. REV. ZQ (QRRd); Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, SQ N.Y.U. L. REV. Q^^Q, Q^dQ
n.QOQ (ZOOd) (applying envelope-theorem reasoning to analysis of investment in law
enforcement). We discuss specieic applications of the envelope theorem to the interaction
between tax and non-tax legal rules below. See infra note ^Q.
14
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tax rate. Recall that the individual already was raising cattle on some of her
land, and she was selling that cattle at the market and paying tax on those sales.
Now, she is paying a little less in taxes on all of those sales—sales that would
have happened regardless of the tax change. With respect to those sales of
cows raised on land that she would have allocated to cattle raising anyway, the
individual is better off: she is doing exactly what she was doing before but now
her after-tax income is a little bit higher. Symmetrically, the government is
worse off, since it is raising less revenue and has less to spend on public goods.
Assuming that the value of X_ in the hands of the individual and the
government is the same, the beneKit to the individual and the cost to the
government exactly offset.15 The shift in wealth from the government to the
individual is a “transfer” that does not affect the total resources available to
society. In the language of economics, this is the “mechanical” effect on tax
revenue (as distinguished from the “behavioral” effect).
Summing up, the effect on the total resources available to society as a
result of a small reduction in the tax rate is equal to the behavioral effect on
tax revenue (here, X`), minus administrative and compliance costs (here,
zero). We intentionally ignore mechanical effects in this calculation because
those are transfers—one side (here, the individual) is better off, and the other
side (here, the government) is symmetrically worse off. This is the key lesson
from the BETR framework. The effect of a small change in tax policy on the
total resources available to society (i.e., the efKiciency effect of the tax policy
change) is the behavioral effect on tax revenue less any change in
administrative and compliance costs.
+. Reported vs. Unreported Income
In the example above, the individual’s only possible uses of her land were
(a) raising cattle to be sold at the market in a transaction observable by the tax
authority or (b) growing vegetables for household consumption. Now we will
introduce a third option: the individual can grow vegetables that she sells to

We discuss the reasons why this assumption is appropriate in our prior work. See
Hemel & Weisbach, supra note QQ.
15
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her neighbors for cash in transactions that—though legally subject to
taxation—will not be reported by the individual to the tax authority.
As before, the individual will allocate her land across these three uses
optimally, such that there are no additional gains to be had from reallocation.
If her net after-tax income from allocating an additional unit of land to cattle
raising is Xa (i.e., X_, in pre-tax income less X` in taxes), this means that she
also derives Xa in value from an additional unit of land given over to growing
vegetables for household consumption or for neighborhood sales. This could
be because her neighbors are only willing to pay Xa for the vegetables and the
individual can hide that income from tax authorities costlessly. Or it could be
because her neighbors are willing to pay more than Xa for the vegetables but
the individual bears costs in hiding that income from tax authorities (e.g., the
cost of opening a secret bank account16).
Now imagine that instead of lowering the tax rate, the government slightly
raises the rate at which it audits taxpayers. The very small increase in the
frequency of audits makes it slightly likelier that the individual will get caught
evading taxes on her neighborhood vegetable sales. If she is caught, she will
have to pay past-due taxes and penalties. The increase in the audit rate
therefore makes the neighborhood vegetable sales slightly less attractive than
they were before, causing the taxpayer to reallocate a bit of her land from that
purpose to either (a) raising cattle or (b) growing vegetables for household
consumption.17
What is the effect on the individual’s well-being from reallocating from
neighborhood vegetable sales to (a) or (b)? Again, there is no material effect,
because the individual already was indifferent between these options. If the

The cost of not reporting income might also be the moral disutility that the individual
experiences from violating the tax laws. If the value she assigns to that moral disutility is less
than the amount she pays in taxes, she will bear that moral-disutility cost.
17 If the vegetables that she sells to her neighbors are the same vegetables that she grows
for herself and her family, then she will not need to reallocate land; she can just reallocate the
vegetables. For purposes of our example, it doesn’t matter which is the case.
16
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individual reallocates toward raising cattle that she sells for X_, at the market
in a taxable transaction, then the government gains an additional X` in tax
revenue, and society is X` better off. This is a behavioral effect on tax revenue.
If the individual reallocates toward growing vegetables for household
consumption, then the government does not collect any additional revenue,
and society is no better off than before.
Once more, the change in tax policy generates mechanical effects on tax
revenue in addition to behavioral effects. When the government audits more
taxpayers, more people will be caught evading taxes, and they will have to pay
back taxes and penalties. Those payments are transfers from the private sector
to the public sector: what the evader loses is precisely equal to what the
government gains.
Changing the audit rate, however, will lead to an additional set of costs not
seen in our Kirst example: the additional administrative and compliance costs
from the new audits. By “administrative costs,” we refer to costs borne by the
government in collecting taxes. By “compliance costs,” we refer to costs borne
by the private sector. Administrative and compliance costs of tax collection are
real resource costs that reduce the total amount available to society. Therefore,
the effect of the audits on the total resources available to society is the
behavioral effect on tax revenue less the change in administrative and
compliance costs.
We have illustrated the BETR using simple examples involving (_) a
tradeoff between market and nonmarket production and (+) a tradeoff
between reported and unreported income, but the framework applies much
more broadly. It applies in any case where an individual is indifferent between
two options, one of which will cause her to pay more in taxes (but bear less of
some other cost). For example, it applies to the familiar labor-leisure tradeoff
(where the taxpayer’s alternative to market production is not household
production, but no production at all). It also applies to circumstances in which
an employee is choosing between taxable income and untaxed fringe beneKits,
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such as health insurance.18 It applies, too, when the individual is choosing
between two types of income subject to different tax rates (e.g., income from
wages versus income from self-employment19). In all these cases, the effect of
the change in tax policy on the total resources available to society is the
behavioral effect on tax revenue less administrative and compliance costs.
There are a number of nuances that we have left out of this explanation—
nuances that are important to the BETR but less essential to understanding the
Legal Envelope Theorem. One such issue is the computation of “compliance
costs” (and, more speciKically, the limited circumstances in which tax-related
compliance costs might not enter the BETR directly).20 Another issue,
mentioned above, is whether X_ in the hands of a private individual should be
valued the same as X_ in the hands of the government.21 We explore these
subtleties at length in earlier work.22 We set them aside here in order to focus
more intensively on the legal-rules context, to which we now turn.

18 An optimizing employee will select the mix of compensation that leaves her indifferent

between an extra oQ of taxable income and an extra oQ of untaxed fringe beneeits. (If her tax
rate is ^O percent, that means she values the extra oQ of untaxed fringe beneeits at oO.aO.) A
policy change that causes her to reallocate oQ of compensation from untaxed fringe beneeits
to taxable income will leave her no worse off than before, but the behavioral effect on tax
revenue makes society better off (by oO.^O if the tax rate is ^O percent).
19 Starting in ZOQS, self-employment income is eligible for a ZO percent deduction for
single taxpayers with up to oQWa,WOO in taxable income and married-eiling-jointly taxpayers
with up to o^QW,OO in taxable income. Those thresholds are adjusted each year for inelation.
Taxpayers with income above those thresholds are eligible for a full or partial deduction under
certain circumstances. The beneeit is set to sunset at the end of ZOZW. See I.R.C. § QRRA.
20 See Hemel & Weisbach, supra note QQ (manuscript at Za).
21 See id. (manuscript at aO).
22 For further discussion of this point, see Daniel Hemel, Jennifer Nou & David Weisbach,
Appendix to “The Marginal Revenue Rule in Cost-BeneDit Analysis” (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.,
Working Paper, ZOQS), https://ssrn.com/abstract=^Z^OOO^.
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The BETR, as developed above, measures the change in the total resources
available to society resulting from small changes in tax policy. We show here
that the same framework also allows us to measure the change in the total
resources available to society resulting from small changes in legal rules that
affect tax collection. The core logic is the same. If society sets its legal rules to
maximize net beneKits irrespective of tax consequences, then small changes to
otherwise-optimal legal rules will not have Kirst-order effects on the sum of
non-tax net beneKits. They may, however, have tax consequences, thus
changing total social resources. We call this the Legal Envelope Theorem
because it arises from the same envelope effect outlined above.
_. The Legal Envelope Theorem in a Single-Person Setting
To illustrate the Legal Envelope Theorem, we begin with an example that
directly parallels our exposition of the BETR in the previous Section. Imagine
again that a single individual is allocating a Kixed amount of land across two
uses—cattle raising for sale in the taxable sector and vegetable growing for
untaxed household consumption. On the margin, the individual is indifferent
between (a) allocating a unit of land to cattle raising, selling the cattle for X_,
on the market, and paying a tax of X`, or (b) allocating a unit of land to
vegetable growing, resulting in Xa worth of untaxed household consumption.
The individual’s choice will be inKluenced not only by the tax rate—as
illustrated above—but also by the constellation of legal rules that affect the
costs and beneKits of cattle raising and vegetable growing. These include laws
addressing the treatment of animals, fencing, fertilizer use, the transportation
of livestock to market, and much more.
Consider any one of these laws—for example, the maximum amount of
water-soluble nitrogen that a grower may apply per square foot.23 Nitrogen
enhances crop yields, so a lower limit on nitrogen means the individual and

See, e.g., N.J. Rev. Stat. § WS:QOA-d^ (ZOQ^) (establishing limits on the use of watersoluble nitrogen).
23
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her household will grow fewer vegetables per unit of land. But excess nitrogen
use can contaminate groundwater, potentially seeping into the household’s
drinking well.24 For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the direct effects
of the change in the legal rule all fall on a single individual or household—i.e.,
this household’s drinking water and only this household’s drinking water will
be affected by a rule change. In the next Section, we will consider the more
complicated case in which changes in legal rules reallocate entitlements across
individuals and households.
Ignoring tax collection consequences, the efKicient fertilizer rule would set
the maximum amount of water-soluble nitrogen such that the marginal beneKit
from a small reduction in that amount (improved drinking water) equals the
marginal cost (lower crop yields). We will say that this rule satisKies the
standard of “simple efKiciency.” A rule accords with simple efKiciency if the nontax beneKits from a slight change in the rule equal the non-tax costs—i.e., if the
rule maximizes total resources before accounting for taxes—holding the
distribution of income Kixed.25

See Mary H. Ward, Too Much of a Good Thing? Nitrate from Nitrogen Fertilizers and
Cancer—President’s Cancer Panel—October ZQ, ZOOS, ZN REV. ENVTL. HEALTH ^Wa (ZOOR).
25 As Louis Kaplow has argued in a related context, simple efeiciency must be deeined
holding the distribution of income (or the distribution of utilities) eixed. The tax and transfer
system imposes efeiciency costs to redistribute income. For example, income-based taxes and
transfers distort how much people work and save, what jobs they take, where and how they
invest, and so forth. Society judges these efeiciency costs as worth bearing in order to get the
redistributive beneeit of shifting resources from people with a low marginal utility of wealth
(the rich) to people with a high marginal utility of wealth (the poor).
If simple efeiciency were not deeined holding distribution eixed, the category of “efeicient”
legal rules would include regressive legal rules that offset the efeiciency costs of the tax system.
For example, if the tax system takes a dollar from a rich person and gives it to a poor person
at an efeiciency cost of oO.ZW, an “efeicient” legal rule might give the dollar back to the rich
person, even if the efeiciency beneeit were less than oO.ZW. The same qualieier is needed in
much of the literature discussing the relationship between the redistribution, tax system, and
legal rules. For further discussion of this point, with guidance on how and why to apply the
constant-distribution-of-income approach, see Louis Kaplow, A UniDied Perspective on
EfDiciency, Redistribution, and Public Policy, a^ NAT’L TAX J. NZR (ZOZO).
24
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Importantly for our purposes, a slight reduction in the nitrogen limit also
slightly lowers the value of allocating land to vegetable growing. The yield on
the marginal unit of land allocated to vegetable growing is now a bit less than
Xa. As a result, the individual reallocates one unit of land from vegetable
growing to cattle raising.
The effect on the individual’s utility is, as in Section I.A, approximately
zero. The reduction in her vegetable yields is balanced out by the improvement
in the quality of her drinking water. Also, the envelope theorem tells us that if
her allocation of land between cattle raising and vegetable growing was
previously optimal, the reallocation of one unit of land from vegetable growing
to cattle raising does not make her appreciably better off or worse off than
before. But the reallocation of one unit of land from vegetable growing to cattle
raising does—as before—have a Kirst-order effect on the total resources
available to society. Now, the individual’s taxable income rises by X_,, and so
the taxes she pays increase by X`.
This result should not be surprising, since it is—for all intents and
purposes—the same result as in Section I.A. The only modiKication is that the
relevant policy change that caused the individual to reallocate one unit of land
from vegetable growing to cattle raising (or, at a higher level of generality, from
the untaxed sector to the taxed sector) was a change in a non-tax legal rule
rather than an element of the tax system. The change in total resources
available to society is, as under the BETR, the behavioral effect on tax revenue
(here, X`) less any change in administrative and compliance costs. If, for
example, the government had to spend money to implement the reduction in
the nitrogen limit, that would be a real resource cost that enters the totalutility analysis, equivalent to the tax administrative costs considered in Section
I.A. Similarly, if the individual has to spend money to comply with the reduction
in the nitrogen limit, such as tracking and reporting her nitrogen use to a
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regulator, these costs are real resources that enter the analysis in the same way
tax compliance costs do.
Our analysis shows that we should change the fertilizer rule so that it no
longer satisKies simple efKiciency, but instead maximizes the total resources
available to society, inclusive of taxes, or what we will call “full efKiciency. “By
moving away from simple efKiciency, we do not make the individual
rancher/grower appreciably worse off or better off, but we generate X` of
additional tax revenue that can be used to produce X` worth of public goods
or returned to the rancher to spend how she pleases. The move away from
simple efKiciency thereby constitutes an increase in total resources.
A short-hand way of thinking about these effects is that the change in the
legal rule generates what might be called a Kiscal externality.26 It causes the
rancher/grower to change her behavior in a way that is immaterial to her but
generates a beneKit to others because of the additional resources available to
the government. The Legal Envelope Theorem can be reframed as stating that
efKiciency needs to take this Kiscal externality into account.

Nathaniel Hendren uses this terminology in a similar sense. See Nathaniel Hendren,
The Policy Elasticity, ^O TAX POL’Y & ECON. WQ, W^ (ZOQd) (deeining “eiscal externality” as “the
impact of the behavioral response to [a] policy on the government budget outlays per dollar
of government expenditure”). The term is sometimes used in a related but distinct sense in
the literature on eiscal federalism and interjurisdictional competition. See, e.g., Zvi Hercowitz
& David Pines, Migration with Fiscal Externalities, Nd J. PUB. ECON. Qd^, Qd^-dN (QRRQ) (stating
that “[i]n a strict sense eiscal externality is deeined as a situation where a pure public good is
einanced by residence-based taxes,” such that migration—which affects the per-capita cost but
not the per-capita beneeit of public goods, generates positive eiscal externalities for the
jurisdiction into which migrants are moving and negative eiscal externalities for the
jurisdiction out of which migrants are moving); Bev Dahlby, Fiscal Externalities and the Design
of Intergovernmental Grants, ^ INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. ^Ra, ^RS (QRRd) (“[I]interjurisdictional
eiscal externalities occur when a government’s tax and expenditure decisions affect the wellbeing of taxpayers in other jurisdictions . . . .”).
26
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+. The Legal Envelope Theorem in a Multiperson Setting

In the immediately preceding example, we imagined that the non-tax costs
and beneKits of the change in the legal rule all fell on the same individual. This
may accurately describe some legal rules, which seek to maximize the
wellbeing of all individuals to whom they apply rather than to assign rights,
resources, and responsibilities across different individuals. Oftentimes,
however, legal rules affect different individuals differently, potentially making
some individuals better off and others worse off. The Legal Envelope Theorem
applies in this case as well: simple efKicient legal rules do not maximize total
resources because they ignore tax effects. Fully efKicient legal rules must take
all of the effects into account.27
To see how the analysis applies in the multi-person setting, continue with
the immediately preceding example, except imagine now that the nitrogen
from fertilizer contaminates not the rancher/grower’s own drinking well but
the wells of her neighbors. Lowering the water-soluble nitrogen limit from the
simple efKicient level will make the rancher/grower worse off, because she
now reaps a smaller yield from the land that she continues to allocate to
vegetable growing. It will, however, make her neighbors better off, because

In the single individual case—which in public economics is typically called a Ramsey
model after the earlier twentieth century British mathematician Frank Ramsey—there is no
reason to distinguish between wealth and utility. Ramsey models, like the one we use,
preclude distributional considerations by assumption because they involve only one
individual, and so no redistribution across individuals.
In the multiple-person case considered in this Section, the difference between wealth
and utility becomes relevant because different individuals will have different marginal
utilities of wealth. It matters which individuals have resources if we want to maximize a
function of individual utilities. Deeinitions of efeiciency try to abstract away from these
distributional effects by focusing on total resources (or total wealth), rather than who has
those resources.
To keep the multiple person case as parallel as possible to the single person case, we will
focus on the maximization of total resources, rather than total utility. We can do this by
assuming that all individuals affected by the legal rule have the same marginal utility of wealth.
We explicitly consider differences in the marginal utility of wealth in Section I.C.Z.
27
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they now beneKit from safer drinking water. It generates a transfer between the
rancher and her neighbor.
Since we were previously at the simple efKicient legal rule, we know that
the transfer away from the rancher is of equal size as the transfer to her
neighbors. (If not, we could have adjusted the prior legal rule and increased
total resources leaving aside tax effects, which means that the prior rule would
not have been simple efKicient.) The transfer does not affect the total resources
available to society. As a result, we treat the transfer as a wash for purposes of
measuring the efKiciency effects of the legal change.
Because the rancher/grower had previously chosen the privately optimal
allocation of her land, her behavioral change—her reallocation of one unit of
land from vegetable growing to cattle raising—also does not materially affect
her own wellbeing. This, too, is the envelope effect at work: if the
rancher/grower was at the private optimum, then we know that the marginal
beneKit to her of a small change in either direction was equal to the marginal
cost, and a small reallocation will not make her appreciably better off or worse
off. It does, however, affect the total resources available to society, because
when she reallocates land to cattle raising, she pays more in taxes. Again, the
change in society’s total resources is measured by the BETR: the behavioral
effect on tax revenue of X` less any change in administrative and compliance
costs.
The neighbors may also change their behavior in response to improved
drinking water. Those changes also will not make them materially better or
worse off. For example, improved drinking water from their well might cause
the neighbors to drink a little bit less beer and a little bit more water; if they
were previously allocating their liquid consumption between beer and water
optimally, then they are effectively indifferent to a small change in the direction
of more water consumption. The neighbors’ behavioral change would,
however, have a Kirst-order effect on the total resources available to society if
it changed tax collections (e.g., if beer is taxable and water is not). Under those
circumstances, we would use the BETR to calculate the effect of the neighbors’
behavioral change on total resources. The BETR adds (or nets, depending on
the sign) these effects to the effects of changes in the rancher/grower’s
behavior to measure the total change in resources from the change in the legal
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rule. If the change is positive, the simple efKicient legal rule fails to maximize
total resources, and we can do better by modifying it.
To summarize: Small changes in “simple efKicient” legal rules do not
materially affect the sum of total resources available to society except through
the tax channel. We know this because the simple efKicient legal rule is, by
deKinition, set to maximize total resources before taking taxes into account.
Therefore, a small change in either direction may generate transfers but has
no Kirst-order effects on total resources. Moreover, since individuals are
choosing their own behavior to maximize their own wellbeing, a small change
in their behavior in either direction does not leave them materially better off
or worse off. These behavioral changes may, however, have tax collection
consequences. When they do, the BETR allows us to see how those behavioral
changes affect the total resources available to society.
So far, we have illustrated the Legal Envelope Theorem through what in
the natural and social sciences is called a “toy model,” a deliberately simplistic
model that strips away many details so that we can convey the central
mechanism concisely. In Part II, we will show how our toy model corresponds
to a wide range of real-world scenarios in which non-tax legal rules affect tax
collection. Before doing so, we will consider a number of points left out of the
toy model but important to the analysis that follows.
C.

Comments and QualiKications
_. More than Marginal Changes

The Legal Envelope Theorem applies to small changes in legal rules away
from simple efKiciency. Because the marginal non-tax beneKit from a legal rule
change in any direction away from the simple-efKicient legal rule equals the
marginal non-tax cost (both at the individual level and the level of society), we
can proceed as if the only effects of the change on total resources are those
captured by the BETR. Once we make more than small changes, however, there
will be Kirst-order costs in the primary legal area, at which point the envelope
theorem logic no longer applies.
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Nonetheless, the Legal Envelope Theorem can help us analyze larger legalrule changes in two ways. First, and most straightforwardly, the Legal Envelope
Theorem can be used not only to analyze marginal changes from simple
efKicient legal rules but also to Kind fully efKicient legal rules. A fully efKicient
legal rule maximizes total resources including those affected by the primary
legal system and those in the tax system. At the optimum, the marginal loss in
simple efKiciency should equal the marginal Kiscal externality, as measured by
the BETR.
Because tax rates are substantial in developed countries, the fully efKicient
legal rule may deviate substantially from the simple efKicient rule. The Kiscal
externality is equal to the tax rate. We have been using `,% in our example,
but in the United States, the tax rate often exceeds Y,% (taking both federal
and state taxes into account), and in other developing countries may be well
above Y,%.28
Second, the Legal Envelope Theorem also offers insight into the effects of
discrete changes to legal rules that are not marginal. For example, repealing
the Statute of Frauds altogether would be a discrete legal-rule change.29
Discrete changes present a challenge not present with marginal or small
changes. With respect to small rule changes, anyone who alters her own
behavior in response to the rule change was previously indifferent between
engaging in a little more or a little less of the relevant activity. Not so for
individuals who change their behavior in response to a discrete change. Some
of these changes may be “inframarginal”—i.e., they leave individuals
substantially better off or worse off than before. For example, if we eliminate

28 See David Altig, Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Elias Ilin & Victor Ye, Marginal
Net Taxation of Americans’ Labor Supply QR tbl.Z (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. ZaQdN, May ZOZO), http://www.nber.org/papers/wZaQdN (calculating that the
mean marginal tax rate on an additional oQOOO of current-year earnings—taking into account
a wide range of tax and transfer consequences—is W^.S percent for households in the lowest
income quintile and above WO percent for more than a quarter of households).
29 For an argument in favor of Statute of Frauds repeal, see Michael Braunstein, Remedy,
Reason, and the Statute of Frauds: A Critical Economic Analysis, QRSR UTAH L. REV. ^S^, NZZ-^Q.
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the Statute of Frauds, making tax evasion easier, some of the behavioral
changes will reKlect inframarginal changes, and we cannot assume that anyone
who changed her behavior was indifferent.
The BETR and the Legal Envelope Theorem still can aid our analysis of
discrete changes, though the function of these tools will be nuanced. When a
discrete change in a tax or non-tax legal rule leads to a change in tax revenue
due to behavioral effects, the BETR can allow us to estimate lower bounds and
upper bounds of the effect on total resources from a given individual’s taxrelated behavioral change (i.e., a behavioral change that affects taxes
collected). In some circumstances, these lower-bound and upper-bound
estimates may be all we need.
To illustrate, imagine that the wage rate is X_, per hour and the tax rate
starts out at `, percent. Then the tax rate falls to +, percent, and an individual
works an hour more and pays X+ more in taxes. We know that the individual
valued an additional hour of leisure at Xa or more; otherwise, she would not
have been working the hour in the Kirst place. We also know that she did not
value an additional hour of leisure at more than Xh; otherwise, she still would
not be working. The increase in total resources resulting from the behavioral
change is at least X+, representing the behavioral effect on tax revenue. It is
potentially as much as X`, representing the behavioral effect on tax revenue
plus the beneKit to the individual of replacing Xa worth of leisure with Xh in
after-tax income.30
The same analysis applies to legal rules. Imagine that a new nitrogen limit
for fertilizer raises the cost of growing vegetables by X_ per unit of land. The
rancher/grower in the previous two Sections reallocates one unit of land from
vegetable growing to cattle raising, causing her to earn an additional X_, in
taxable income and pay an additional X` in taxes. We know that the

Put differently, the beneeit to the individual from the behavioral change cannot be less
than zero; otherwise she would not have made the change. And it cannot be greater than oQ;
otherwise she would not have needed the tax cut in order to make the change. So we add the
oZ behavioral effect on tax revenue to an individual beneeit ranging from zero to oQ.
30

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3725155

23

The Legal Envelope Theorem

rancher/grower assigned a value of at least Xa to the vegetables from that unit
of land; otherwise, she would have been raising cattle there in the Kirst place.
We also know that the rancher/grower did not value the vegetables at more
than Xh; otherwise, she would have continued to grow vegetables even after
the new nitrogen limit. The increase in total resources resulting from taxrelated behavioral changes is at least X+, representing the X` behavioral effect
on tax revenue less the loss to the rancher of replacing Xh of vegetables with
Xa of after-tax income. It is potentially as much as X`, representing purely the
X` behavioral effect on tax revenue, with the rancher/grower’s Xa of additional
after-tax income and Xa less of vegetables netting out.
Even where we can estimate only lower and upper bounds, the BETR and
the Legal Envelope Theorem can help us make decisions about discrete
changes to legal rules. Sometimes, a lower-bound estimate of the increase in
total resources resulting from a tax-related behavioral change will be
sufKiciently large that, even if the true effect is only the lower bound, the
beneKits will outweigh the non-tax costs of deviating from simple efKiciency. In
other cases, an upper-bound estimate of the increase in total resources
resulting from tax-related behavioral changes will be sufKiciently small that,
even if the true effect is the upper bound, the non-tax costs of deviating from
simple efKiciency will swamp the beneKits. There still will be instances in which
the non-tax costs of deviating from simple efKiciency lie between the lowerand upper-bound estimates of the increase in total resources from tax-related
behavioral changes, in which case the BETR and the Legal Envelope Theorem
will not be determinative. Even in those circumstances, though, the BETR and
Legal Envelope Theorem can give us a rough sense of magnitudes that a focus
on simple efKiciency ignores.
+. Redistribution and the Relationship to Kaplow & Shavell (_jj))
In establishing the Legal Envelope Theorem, we focused on the efKiciency
effects of tax and legal rules. We set aside distributional aspects, such as the
possibility that the rancher/grower might be wealthier than her neighbors (or,
vice versa, that the neighbors might be wealthier than the rancher/grower).
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There is a debate about whether, and the extent to which, legal rules
should be used to redistribute income.31 To the extent they are used to
redistribute income, legal rules should not be set to be efKicient—whether
simple or full. Here we address the relationship between that debate and our
claims. We make two points.

31 The canonical analysis of the relationship between distributional issues and legal rules

is, as noted above, the QRRN article by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell. Kaplow & Shavell, Why
the Legal System, supra note S. For additional statements of the result and clarieications, see
Shavell, supra note S; Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules, supra note S; Louis Kaplow, On the
(Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Government Policy, QS J. ECON. PERS.
QWR (ZOON); Louis Kaplow, On the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation Even When Income
Taxation Is Not Optimal, RO J. PUB. ECON. QZ^W (ZOOd). Kaplow and Shavell’s arguments have
spawned a large and heated literature. Key interlocutors include Christine Jolls, Behavioral
Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, WQ VAND. L. REV. QdW^ (QRRS); Ronen Avraham,
David Fortus & Kyle Logue, Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income
Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, SR IOWA L. REV. QQZW (ZOO^); Chris William
Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, ZR J.
LEGAL STUD. aRa (ZOOO); Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal
Rule Design Should Incorporate Equity as Well as EfDiciency, QZ^ YALE L.J. ZNaS (ZOQN); and Lee
Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive DeDicit in Law and Economics, QOO MINN.
L. REV. QOWQ (ZOQW).
Chris Sanchirico uses envelope-theorem reasoning to argue that legal rules should be
adjusted away from efeiciency in order to shift resources from rich to poor (in contrast to our
argument that legal rules should be adjusted away from simple efeiciency in order to facilitate
redistributive taxation that then shifts resources from the rich to the poor). See Sanchirico,
supra, at SQ^-ZO. Sanchirico’s argument is valid if individuals with the same taxable income
differ in their marginal utility of wealth in ways that the legal system can observe but the tax
system cannot. See Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules, supra note S, at SZS. Under those
circumstances, changes to otherwise-efeicient legal rules might be used to redistribute from
individuals with lower marginal utility of wealth to individuals with higher marginal utility of
wealth. The practical difeiculty in implementing this insight, as Kaplow and Shavell note, is
that the marginal utility of wealth cannot be observed directly—and thus, the insight does not
tell policymakers in which direction to adjust otherwise-efeicient legal rules. See id. at S^Z. By
contrast, our version of the Legal Envelope Theorem recommends modieications based on
observable changes in tax revenue (and does not depend upon unobservable marginal
utilities).
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First, to a great extent, that debate is orthogonal to our claims. Our claims
are about which legal rules are efKicient. Regardless of whether one thinks legal
rules should be used to redistribute, it is important to know which legal rules
are efKicient. For example, for a given level of redistribution, we want the most
efKicient legal rules. And understanding which legal rules are efKicient is central
to understanding the costs of redistribution through legal rules.
Moreover, regardless of one’s views about whether rules should be used
to redistribute directly, distributional concerns strengthen the importance of
adjusting legal rules to take the tax system into account. Taxation is society’s
most powerful tool for addressing income and wealth inequality. Taxes allow
us to shift resources away from high-income individuals and households to the
rest of society, and negative taxes—like the earned income tax credit and the
child tax credit—allow us to transfer resources to low-income individuals and
households. From a welfarist perspective, the primary reason why we do not
tax at a _,, percent rate and redistribute wealth equally across individuals is
that taxation (whether on the basis of income, consumption, or wealth)
introduces inefKiciencies. Making the tax system more efKicient allows us to
redistribute more, and so using legal rules to make it easier to tax is more
important the more that we care about distribution. That is, our analysis is
orthogonal to the arguments over whether legal rules should be used to
redistribute income, but it is central to the project of reducing income
inequality.
Second, the Legal Envelope Theorem is consistent with prior work
establishing that non-tax legal rules themselves generally are not the most
effective tools for redistributing resources from high-income to low-income
individuals (or high-wealth to low-wealth individuals). As noted, the canonical
analysis of the relationship between distributional issues and legal rules is a
_jj) article by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.32 Kaplow and Shavell argue
that the tax system can achieve distributional goals more efKiciently than legal

32

Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System, supra note S.
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rules. They conclude, therefore, that legal rules generally should not seek to
redistribute income and, instead, should pursue efKiciency.
Kaplow and Shavell consider a redistributive legal rule and a tax on labor
income. The legal rule by construction deviates from simple efKiciency in an
attempt to redistribute income. For example, an efKicient strict liability system
sets damages equal harm. To make the rule redistributive, damages could be a
function of the income of the injurer, with damages set lower than harm for
low-income defendants, and increasing relative to harm as the injurer’s
income goes up, so that damages are higher than harm for high-income
defendants.33
Kaplow and Shavell suggest the following thought experiment. Replace the
inefKicient redistributive legal rule with the efKicient one, and simultaneously
adjust the tax rate schedule so that at each income level, individuals are equally
well off. For example, in our hypothetical inefKicient strict liability regime
described above, high-income individuals were worse off relative to an
efKicient regime. When we replace the inefKicient regime with the efKicient one,
we would simultaneously increase the tax rate on high-income individuals so
that they are no better off than under the inefKicient rule. Imagine that we do
the same at each income level—for example, lowering the tax rate on lowincome individuals and replacing their favorable tort system with an efKicient
one.34
Kaplow and Shavell then examine the effects of this swap. By construction,
individuals at each income level are no better or worse off than before.
Moreover, the effective tax schedule (the actual tax schedule plus any implicit
tax due to the tort system) is the same before and after the swap, and Kaplow
and Shavell assume that individual labor-supply choices will respond to
changes in the effective tax schedule in the same way they respond to changes
in the actual tax schedule.35 But we have replaced the inefKicient tort rule with

See Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System, supra note S, at ddR–daO.
See id. at daQ–aN.
35 See id. at daQ.
33
34
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an efKicient tort rule, which means that total resources have increased. Since
the tax changes leave every individual as well off as under the inefKicient rule
but total resources increase, the increase in resources shows up as an increase
in tax revenue, which can then be used to lower taxes on the rich and increase
transfers to the poor or, equivalently, to provide public goods that everyone
values.36 Therefore, we should prefer the swap—the efKicient legal rule and the
modiKied tax schedule—to the inefKicient legal rule and the original tax
schedule. The swap generates a Pareto improvement: everyone is at least as
well off as before and some people or all people are better off. As a result,
Kaplow and Shavell conclude, legal rules should not seek to redistribute
wealth. Instead, we should use legal rules to pursue efKiciency and the tax
system to redistribute wealth.
This conclusion is consistent with our claims about which legal rules are
efKicient. Although they appear, in their main text, to support the idea that we
should pursue what we have called simple efKiciency, this is driven by two
limiting assumptions in their model. First, they assume a relatively simple tax
system. Although they do not specify the details of their tax system, we take it
to be a tax on labor income with no enforcement problems. Second, Kaplow
and Shavell make a technical assumption about the individual utility function,
known as weak separability. This assumption guarantees that the content of
legal rules has no effect on the ability of the tax system to operate.37
When we relax these assumptions, our arguments and Kaplow and
Shavell’s are consistent. Kaplow and Shavell explicitly consider the effects of
relaxing their weak separability assumption. In this case, they conclude legal
rules should deviate from simple efKiciency but only in a limited way. The key
idea is that a tax on labor income distorts the choice of how much to work.
Individuals reduce their work and increase their leisure. Legal rules can, when

See id. at daN.
In particular, they assume that utility takes the form 𝑈 = 𝑈#𝑙, 𝑢(𝑐! , 𝑐" , . . . 𝑐# )+, where l
is labor effort, and ci is consumption of good i. This assumption is not strictly necessary for
their core conclusions but greatly simplieies the analysis. For further discussion, see
Kaplow, supra note ZW.
36
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we relax the weak separability assumption, increase the relative price of
leisure, offsetting this distortion. The legal system can help the tax system
function, but it still does not seek to directly redistribute.
This is precisely the same effect we consider with the Legal Envelope
Theorem, but we do so in the context of a more complex tax system, one that
may tax different activities at different rates, that has enforcement problems,
that requires administrative and compliance costs, and so forth. The legal
system in this case plays the same conceptual rule of helping the tax system. It
acts to penalize choices that reduce tax collections and to subsidize choices
that increase tax collections—but the role for legal rules is much larger.
Even in this more general context, the legal system still lacks any general
advantage over the tax system in redistributing income directly.38 Instead, the
legal system is helping the tax system function better. In that sense, the legal
system is important for redistribution, but indirectly by making the central
tool for redistribution, the tax and transfer system, function better. As a result,
our arguments are thus compatible with, and are an extension of, Kaplow and
Shavell’s arguments.
`. Relationship to Public Finance Literature
The literature on the economics of taxation, for the most part, considers
the design of the tax system taking the legal system as given. For example, the
economics literature often takes labor supply elasticity as a primitive rather
than a choice. The literature assumes there is such a thing called a corporation
whose structure and operations are determined exogenously. In addition, for

We say that the legal system lacks any “general advantage” because, like Kaplow and
Shavell, we acknowledge the possibility of cases in which behavior may respond less to
redistribution via the legal system than via the tax system.
38
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the most part, the economics literature assumes that there are a set of
activities—colloquially leisure—that cannot be taxed for external reasons.39
We instead treat these and similar items as choices. Within some range,
we can change the elasticity of labor supply by changing the legal rules
surrounding work. Corporations are legal inventions and can have the
characteristics that we choose. And the activities we do not tax depend in large
part on our ability to observe. We can choose legal rules that make it easier
and harder to observe various activities, and we can choose to spend resources
observing.
To illustrate how we differ from the standard approach in economics,
consider a recent paper by three of the most prominent economists currently
working on tax issues, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie
Stantcheva.40 They consider how the optimal top tax rate is affected by three
different behavioral margins: the labor supply elasticity, the ability of
taxpayers to evade taxes, and what they call the bargaining elasticity. The
bargaining elasticity reKlects the ability of top income earners to extract rents

39 The economist Frank Knight deeined leisure as “all non-pecuniary, alternative uses of
time.” FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT QQa (QRWa). For other attempts at a
deeinition of leisure, see Justin Voss, The DeDinition of Leisure, Q J. ECON. ISSUES RQ (QRda), and
Stephen Enke, On the Economics of Leisure, Z J. ECON. ISSUES N^a (QRdS). As noted above, the
BETR and the Legal Envelope Theorem do not require the analyst to distinguish between nonpecuniary uses of time and other pecuniary but untaxed uses of time (e.g., labor in the informal
economy).
Some papers make the non-taxed sector endogenous. See, e.g., Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note
on Optimal Taxation and Administrative Costs, dR AM. ECON. REV. NaW (QRaR); John Douglas
Wilson, On the Optimal Tax Base for Commodity Taxation, aR AM. ECON. REV. QQRd (QRSR); Joel
Slemrod & Wojciech Kopczuk, The Optimal Elasticity Of Taxable Income, SN J. PUB. ECON. RQ
(ZOOZ); Dhammika Dharmapala, Joel Slemrod & John Douglas Wilson, Tax Policy and the
Missing Middle: Optimal Tax Remittance with Firm-Level Administrative Costs, RW J. PUB. ECON.
QO^d (ZOQQ). Our analysis builds on this literature by showing how the legal system can shape
the non-taxed sector’s scope.
40 Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, Optimal Taxation of Top Labor
Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities, d AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y Z^O (ZOQN).
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from their employers, such as CEOs getting paid excessive salaries. They
suggest a top tax rate that reKlects a combination of all three elasticities.
All three of these elasticities are in part determined by law. As we
demonstrate below, legal rules affect the costs and beneKits of work and,
therefore, the labor supply elasticity. They affect the ability of taxpayers to
engage in evasion, such as using anonymous offshore bank accounts, and,
therefore, the evasion elasticity. And they determine the ability of CEOs to
bargain with their employers, and, therefore affect the bargaining elasticity.41
Under the approach we advocate here, we should not simply design the tax
system taking the legal system as Kixed. We should instead design the two in
tandem, recognizing that optimal tax rules depend on the content of legal rules
and that optimal legal rules depend on the structure of the tax system. Our
approach, we believe, will provide more socially beneKicial outcomes because
it allows us to use the full toolkit to design the tax and legal system rather than
only half.
A second issue is how our arguments relate to one of the canonical results
in the economics of taxation, the Corlett-Hague rule.42 The Corlett-Hague rule
has played an inKluential role in the public Kinance literature since it was
introduced by two British economists in _jY`. It holds that goods that are
complements to leisure or substitutes for labor should be taxed at a higher rate
than other goods, and goods that are substitutes for leisure or complements to
labor should be taxed at a lower rate than other goods (or equivalently,
subsidized). The intuition behind this result is the same as we discussed above
with respect to Kaplow and Shavell’s arguments. A tax on labor income distorts
labor effort: people will work less and spend more time on leisure. Taxing, say,

Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva note that this last elasticity, the bargaining elasticity, can
be affected by legal choices. See id. at ZN^. We show that all three elasticities—labor supply
elasticity, tax avoidance, and bargaining—are shaped by legal-design choices.
42 See W. J. Corlett & D. C. Hague, Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation, ZQ
REV. ECON. STUD. ZQ (QRW^).
41
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a complement to leisure reduces this distortion because leisure becomes
relatively less attractive.
Boiled down to its core, the Legal Envelope Theorem proposes that legal
rules should be adjusted away from simple efKiciency to subsidize
complements to taxpaying and penalize substitutes for taxpaying. That is, our
core claim is that the Corlett-Hague logic applies to margins other than
labor/leisure that affect tax collection, such as the choice between taxable and
untaxed production and the choice between reporting and evasion.
Complements to taxpaying should be subsidized. Substitutes for taxpaying
should be penalized. The legal system and the tax system are alternative
mechanisms for implementing Corlett and Hague’s intuitions. The Legal
Envelope Theorem is the legal-rule generalization of the Corlett-Hague tax
rule.
Corlett and Hague suggest using excise taxes while we suggest using legal
rules. Kaplow and Shavell make a suggestion similar to Corlett and Hague and
note that excise taxes will often be a better tool than legal rules.43 A natural
question is when we should use one approach or the other.
Existing literature, extending as far back as the debate between Coase and
Pigou, addresses this question in analyzing whether (and when) we should
rely on public or private enforcement of law.44 The use of excise taxes

43

Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System, supra note S, at dSQ app.

44 Pigou suggested using taxes on externalities, now known as Pigouvian taxes. A.C. PIGOU,

THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (Nth ed. QR^S). Coase pointed out that alternative mechanisms—
including market transactions, eirm organization, and direct regulation—can address
externality problems and will sometimes do so more efeiciently than Pigouvian taxes. Coase,
supra note QZ, at Z-QS, NZ-NN. For an overview of the Coase-Pigou debate, see Nahid
Aslanbeigui & Steven G. Medema, Beyond the Dark Clouds: Pigou and Coase on Social Cost, ^O
HIST. POL. ECON. (QRRS).
For more recent literature exploring the choice of public versus private legal systems,
see Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws:
Resource-Based Evidence, R^ J. FIN. ECON. ZOa (ZOOR); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The
Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in Q HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS NO^ (A. Mitchell
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corresponds to public enforcement: excise taxes are comparable to Kines
imposed by a government agency. Legal rules entail a mix of public and private
enforcement but often involve private enforcement. The choice between excise
taxes and legal rules in any given case will like depend on the particulars in
each case, such as which parties have the relevant information, the incentives
for various parties to enforce, administrative and compliance costs, and
whether bringing in a third party (the government) can improve incentives for
private actors.
In many of our applications below, we consider cases in which legal rules
already regulate a behavior, and the sorts of adjustments recommended by the
Legal Envelope Theorem can be implemented at low marginal administrative
cost. It may be that some of these legal regimes should be replaced with a
different enforcement system that relies on Kines or excise taxes. We leave the
complex choice between legal-rule adjustments and excise taxes for future
work.
II. APPLICATIONS
In this Part, we show that there are a large number of legal rules that affect
the tax system and, as a result, need to be set taking the tax effects into account.
We do not attempt a detailed analysis of each legal rule. Instead, we seek to
show in each case that it is desirable to deviate from the simple efKicient legal
rule, possibly substantially.
We cover four categories of legal rules: laws that affect work, laws
concerning business organizations, laws that affect the size of the informal
economy, and the law of property. Our claim is not that each of these cases is
original. Instead, our claim is that there are a large number of such cases. The

Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., ZOOa); Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, Optimal Law
Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government, N AM. L. & ECON. REV. QQd (ZOOZ); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, ^S J. ECON. LIT.
NW (ZOOO); Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, ^d J.L. & ECON. ZWW
(QRR^).
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effect of legal rules on the tax system is pervasive, and, therefore, tax effects
are likely to be important to determining the optimal content of the legal rules.
A.

Legal Rules Related to Work

Labor income is the most important part of the tax base in all developedcountry tax systems.45 This is inevitable because returns to labor make up a
majority of gross domestic product in developed economies.46 Broad-based
tax systems thus must rely primarily on taxing labor income. Because of the
centrality of labor income to the tax base, the elasticity of labor supply is one
of the most important parameters determining the ability of the tax system to
operate and, importantly, to redistribute.
As noted, the elasticity of labor supply taken by many economists to be a
primitive.47 We illustrate here that it is not a primitive, but is instead affected
by the legal rules surrounding work (in addition to preferences about work
versus leisure).48 In a basic sense, this observation is obvious. Legal academics

45 The major forms of taxes around the world are income taxes, value added taxes (VATs),

and payroll taxes. Income taxes are taxes on both labor income and capital income. Because
labor income is much larger than capital income, labor income is the majority of the base of
an income tax. VATs are nominally taxes on consumption, but it is relatively easy to show that
a VAT is equivalent to a elat rate tax on labor income. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out
the Flat Tax, WZ STAN. L. REV. WRR (ZOOO). Payroll taxes are nominally and effectively taxes on
labor income.
46 INT’L LABOUR ORG. & ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE LABOUR SHARE IN GZO
ECONOMIES W eig.Z (ZOQW), https://www.oecd.org/gZO/topics/employment-and-socialpolicy/The-Labour-Share-in-GZO-Economies.pdf.
47 To give another example, in their review of the economics of labor income taxation,
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez characterize the difference between labor supply
elasticity and the elasticity of tax evasion as follows: “The key distinction between real [labor
supply] and tax avoidance responses is that real responses reelect underlying, deep individual
preferences for work and consumption while tax avoidance responses depend critically on the
design of the tax system and the avoidance opportunities it offers.” Thomas Piketty &
Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Labor Income Taxation, W HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS ^RQ, NQa
(ZOQ^).
48 We are not the eirst to make this point. See Michael Keane & Richard Rogerson, Micro
and Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom, WO J. ECON. LIT.
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who work on employment and labor law do so on the belief that those legal
choices affect the work environment and, presumably, individual choices
regarding work. The same is true of labor economists. They study the effect of
the institutions surrounding work, such as unionization, the minimum wage,
or wrongful discharge laws and regularly recommend reforms to those
institutions on the theory that reforms will lead to better outcomes (e.g.,
encouraging work or—equivalently in our model—increasing pay49). It is only
those studying the tax system—particularly public Kinance economists—who
take the elasticity of labor supply as primitive rather than as a choice. That is,
a simple glance at the massive literature in labor economics, employment law,
and labor law, should be sufKicient to show that the elasticity of labor supply is
not a deep primitive.50 And once we recognize that the elasticity of labor
supply is in part a choice, it follows straightforwardly from the Legal Envelope

NdN, NdW (ZOQZ) (noting that “one important source of confusing in the literature is the idea
that one can estimate a labor supply elasticity in one context and import this elasticity into
other contexts,” and stating that “in general, labor supply elasticities are neither a single
number nor a primitive feature of preferences”).
49 In the BETR, a behavioral change that yields an x increase in taxable wages taxed at
rate t has the same effect on total resources (tx) whether or not the change is an increase in
labor supply (working an additional hour at a wage of x) or an increase in pay of x holding
hours eixed.
50 Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?, ZS J. ECON. PERSP. aa
(ZOQN). The experiences of Scandinavian countries shed some light on the extent to which legal
rules can affect labor supply and, as a result, increase the ability to tax. Scandinavian tax
systems raise substantially more revenue as a percent of GDP than most other Western tax
systems, and yet report some of the highest labor force participation rates in the developed
world as well as low levels of tax evasion. While it might be the case that Scandinavians are
just hard working, Henrik Kleven argues that this is a result of design choices. Their tax
systems have broader bases that discourage avoidance and their governments have adopted
policies that reduce the cost of work. For example, Scandinavian countries have substantial
childcare and elder care subsidies, good public transportation, and good education systems.
These sorts of services reduce the cost of work, and, as a result, reduce the efeiciency costs of
taxing work. While the United States may not desire to adopt Scandinavian-style social welfare
policies, the Scandinavian example shows how much the institutional environment
surrounding work can ineluence work effort.
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Theorem that we can, and should, choose its value based in part on the tax
effects.
There are a vast number of laws that directly regulate or that indirectly
affect work.51 Moreover, laws affecting leisure choices affect labor supply
elasticity, which means that those laws can be thought of as work-related rules
for our purposes. We cannot cover even a modest fraction of these laws—taken
together there are hundreds. Instead, we consider a selection of examples
illustrative of the broader universe.
_. Mandatory BeneKits
Mandates that require employers to provide a particular bundle of
beneKits constitute a core element of the regulation of work. Many, if not most
employment laws take this form. For example, laws require many employers
to provide health insurance,52 family leave,53 a safe workplace environment,54

51 Christine Jolls, in her insightful survey of employment law, lists nine categories of legal

rules regulating work (each category made up of multiple legal rules): safety mandates,
workers compensation, privacy mandates, fringe beneeit mandates, targeted mandates such
as family and medical leave, wrongful discharge laws, unemployment insurance, minimum
wage rules, and overtime rules. Christine Jolls, Employment Law, in Z HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS Q^NR (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., ZOOa). She explicitly leaves off
discrimination law and labor law, both of which are central to work choices. Jolls also does not
consider antitrust laws, which may allow, or disallow, monopsony by employers. And Jolls also
does not list legal rules that may have important but indirect effects on work, such as rules
that affect the costs of commuting, rules that affect the physical work environment such as
zoning or building codes, or laws that affect the costs of obtaining skills needed to work.
52 The Affordable Care Act requires employers with WO or more full-time employees (or
equivalents) to provide health insurance to at least RW percent of their full-timers.
53 The Family and Medical Leave Act of QRR^ requires most employers with WO or more
employees to provide QZ weeks of unpaid leave each year so that employees can recover from
a serious illness or care for a new child or seriously ill family member. See Pub. L. No. QO-^, QOa
Stat. d (codieied as amended at ZR U.S.C. §§ ZdOQ-ZdWN).
54 See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of QRaO, Pub. L. No. RQ-WRd, SN Stat. QWRO
(codieied as amended at ZR U.S.C. ch. QW).
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protection against termination except under certain circumstances,55
protection against unjust discrimination on the basis of a host of
characteristics,56 and many other beneKits. We explore mandated parental
leave and wrongful discharge laws as examples. We start with a general
framework before turning to the particular applications.
a. Framework
To understand how the Legal Envelope Theorem sheds light on mandated
beneKits, begin with a standard labor-economics model of mandatory workrelated beneKits in which a mandate is instituted to correct a market failure. To
simplify the analysis, we will assume that employers pass the cost of the
mandate along to employees through lower wages. Employees are willing to
sacriKice extra wages in order to receive a beneKit that they value. To arrive at
simple efKiciency, the government should mandate additional beneKits until
any further increase in the required beneKit and corresponding reduction in
the wage would leave the employee no better off.57 In addition to changing how
they are compensated, a mandate may also change how much people are

This model tracks an example in Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of
Mandated BeneDits, aR AM. ECON. REV. Qaa, QSQ (QRSR). See also Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence
of Mandated Maternity BeneDits, SN AM. ECON. REV. dZZ (QRRN) (studying the effect of state and
federal laws requiring employers to provide comprehensive health insurance coverage for
childbirth and einding evidence consistent with the Summers example); Christine Jolls,
Accommodation Mandates, W^ STAN. L. REV. ZZ^ (ZOOO) (extending and modifying Summers).
57 This model tracks an example in Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of
Mandated BeneDits, aR AM. ECON. REV. Qaa, QSQ (QRSR). See also Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence
of Mandated Maternity BeneDits, SN AM. ECON. REV. dZZ (QRRN) (studying the effect of state and
federal laws requiring employers to provide comprehensive health insurance coverage for
childbirth and einding evidence consistent with the Summers example); Christine Jolls,
Accommodation Mandates, W^ STAN. L. REV. ZZ^ (ZOOO) (extending and modifying Summers).
57 This model tracks an example in Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of
Mandated BeneDits, aR AM. ECON. REV. Qaa, QSQ (QRSR). See also Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence
of Mandated Maternity BeneDits, SN AM. ECON. REV. dZZ (QRRN) (studying the effect of state and
federal laws requiring employers to provide comprehensive health insurance coverage for
childbirth and einding evidence consistent with the Summers example); Christine Jolls,
Accommodation Mandates, W^ STAN. L. REV. ZZ^ (ZOOO) (extending and modifying Summers).
57
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willing to work: it may have long run employment effects. In the Corlett and
Hague sense, discussed above, the mandate might be a complement to, or
substitute for, taxable, market work.
One might wonder why a mandate is even necessary under these
circumstances—i.e., why employers won’t offer the beneKit absent a
requirement that they do so. One possible explanation is adverse selection. For
example, employers left to their own devices might decide not to offer sick
leave—even though employees value such leave—because employers do not
want to attract unhealthy job-seekers.58 A second possibility is transaction
costs. Employees would bargain with their employers for the beneKit if
bargaining were costless, but it is not, and so employers and employees might
be willing to stick with the default terms of employment provided by law
unless those terms differ dramatically from the outcome for which the
employers and employees would bargain.59 The government thus has some
(though not inKinite) leeway to set the terms of employment arrangements
before employers and workers begin looking for legal alternatives (e.g.,
switching from an employer-employee arrangement to an independentcontractor arrangement). A third possibility is imperfect information. For
example, employees might be misinformed about their rights under the status
quo and would bargain for more beneKits if they were better informed.60
Mandates might also be intended to address entrenched discrimination. For
our purposes, what is important is not why simple efKiciency might call for a
mandatory beneKit, but how the prescription of simple efKiciency diverges from
full efKiciency after accounting for taxes.
Consider the following scenario: An employee faces a `, percent tax rate,
and an employer will reduce taxable wages by X_ for every X_ that the

See Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can
Enhance EfDiciency, d J. L. ECON. & ORG. ^SQ (QRRO); Summers, supra note WW.
59 Employment law would thus reelect a majoritarian default. See Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, WQ STAN. L. REV. QWRQ, QdO^–ON (QRRR).
60 See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, S^ CORNELL L. REV. QOW (QRRa).
58
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employer spends on providing the mandated beneKit. The employer’s
expenses—on wages and on the beneKit—are deductible, so the employer is
indifferent as to which it provides. Now imagine that the government requires
the employer to provide the employee with an untaxed beneKit (e.g., health
insurance or unpaid leave61). Imagine, further, that the mandate is set at a level
that satisKies simple efKiciency. The employee is indifferent between X_ of
taxable wages (X,.a, in after-tax wages) and an extra bit of beneKit to which
the employee assigns a value of X,.a,.
The two effects mentioned above imply that the simple efKicient legal rule
will not be the same as the fully efKicient legal rule. First, holding total
compensation Kixed, adding a mandate often means cash wages go down and a
fraction of the compensation is now paid in the form of the mandate. Because
many mandates, such as health insurance and unpaid leave, are not taxed, this
means that the fraction of taxable compensation goes down. While employers
and employees may be indifferent, at the margin, between taxable and nontaxed compensation, society prefers that the employee receive taxable wages.
Every extra X_ of taxable wages yields X,.`, more of tax revenue, which can be
used to purchase public goods. In these circumstances, society will want the
reduce level of mandated beneKit from the level that satisKies simple efKiciency,
since a lower mandate leads to more tax revenue.
Second, the mandate might affect how much people work (or whether to
work at all) in the taxable sector. For example, as we will discuss, parental leave
many have important effects on women’s workforce participation. To continue
with our example, if, as a result of the mandated beneKit, the worker increases
her workforce participation by an additional hour, she is indifferent—she gives
up leisure time worth X,.a, and gets after-tax compensation of X,.a,—but
society has X,.`, more. Taking both effects into account, the fully efKicient legal
rule should deviate from the simple efKicient rule (except by sheer coincidence

The cost of health insurance to the employer is, straightforwardly, the premium that
the employer pays on the employee’s behalf. The direct cost of unpaid leave to the employer
is, of course, zero (because it is unpaid), but the employer will likely bear indirect costs (e.g.,
the cost of training other employees to eill in for the worker on leave).
61
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when the two effects perfectly offset). Moreover, at the optimum, this deviation
might be signiKicant. With our assumed `, percent tax rate, the beneKits of
shifting from untaxed activities to taxed activities is almost a third of the total
value. Realistic marginal tax rates, both in the United States and abroad, are—
as noted above—often much higher.62 Although we expressed the Legal
Envelope Theorem in terms of marginal deviations from simple efKiciency, the
difference between the simple efKicient and the fully efKicient mandates will
often be anything but marginal.
b. Parental Leave
We can analyze mandated parental leave using this framework.
Notwithstanding large changes in women’s social and economic roles over the
last Y, years in the United States, women still experience pay and employment
gaps relative to men.63 Much of the gap between women’s and men’s pay
appears to arise soon after childbirth.64 As a result, one of the core methods of
addressing women’s participation and pay gaps is to require parental leave.
The idea behind paid parental leave is to allow parents (most often women) to
take short term leave, retain Kirm-speciKic capital, and hopefully be able to
return to the workforce.
Federal law already requires unpaid parental leave. Paid parental leave is
common in European countries but not in the United States, although there
appears to be a shift toward paid parental leave in recent years. Eight states
and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that either already mandate or

62

See supra note ZS.

63 For a detailed analysis of the gender pay gap, see Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn,

The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations, WW J. ECON. LIT. aSR (ZOQa). For an
analysis of the gap in workforce participation, see Sandra Black, Diane Whitmore
Schanzenbach & Audrey Breitwieser, The Recent Decline in Women’s Labor Force Participation,
in THE WQ%, DRIVING GROWTH THROUGH WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION QO (Diane Whitmore
Schanzenbach & Ryan Nunn eds., ZOQa).
64 Claudia Goldin & Joshua Mitchell, The New Life Cycle of Women’s Employment:
Disappearing Humps, Sagging Middles, Expanding Tops, ^Q J. ECON. PERSP. QdQ (ZOQa).
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soon will mandate paid parental leave.65 As we write, the federal government
is enacting paid parental leave for federal employees.66
To understand the effects of parental leave, consider Kirst the case of
unpaid leave. Unpaid leave is an untaxed beneKit. Thus an employee facing a `,
percent tax rate will be indifferent between X_,,x of wages and unpaid-leave
beneKits to which she or he assigns a value of Xa,x. Starting from a simple
efKicient unpaid parental leave policy, the Legal Envelope Theorem might
counsel for a slight move in the direction of less generous leave beneKits (e.g.,
moving from _+ workweeks to __ workweeks and ) workdays). Such a change
would shift the compensation mix toward more taxable wages, thus generating
more tax revenue.
There is some evidence that unpaid parental leave encourages women to
increase their participation in the workforce, as proponents hope. For
example, Sankar Mukhopadhyay examines the labor-output effects of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of _jah, which required employers to provide
the same leave beneKits for pregnant and post-partum mothers as they would
for any other employee experiencing a temporary disability.67 Mukhopadhyay
estimates that unpaid maternity leave reduces labor force participation among
mothers immediately after childbirth but raises labor force participation
among mothers with children between one and six years old by nearly )
percentage points.68 These Kindings suggest that preserving a mother’s
attachment to the labor force immediately after childbirth increases the

In California, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and
Washington, these mandates already have taken effect as of this writing. Massachusetts’s
mandate comes into effect in ZOZQ, Connecticut’s in ZOZZ, and Oregon’s in ZOZ^. BIPARTISAN
POLICY CTR., STATE PAID FAMILY LEAVE LAWS ACROSS THE U.S. Z tbl.Q (Nov. ZOQR),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/ZOQR/QQ/State-Paid-Family-Leave-LawsAcross-the-US.pdf.
66 Ofeice of Personnel Mgmt., Paid Parental Leave—Interim Final Rule, RIN 3206-AN96
(filed Aug, 6, 2020), https://cutt.ly/vdBdUlp.
67 See Sankar Mukhopadhyay, The Effects of the QRaS Pregnancy Discrimination Act on
Female Labor Supply*, W^ INT'L ECON. REV. QQ^^ (ZOQZ).
68 See id. at QQ^d.
65

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3725155

41

The Legal Envelope Theorem

likelihood that she will return to work in the long term, even though it
temporarily reduces her labor output in the short term.69 The additional tax
revenue from her extra years of working is a beneKit of parental leave that a
simple efKiciency calculus would leave out.70 The net effect left out of a simple
efKiciency analysis combines the social cost of reduced taxable compensation
(for any given level of employment) and increased long-term employment.
While Mukhopadhyay focuses on unpaid leave for mothers, much of the
debate over parental leave now focuses on paid leave, including for non-birthgiving parents. Several studies Kind that paid parental leave increases mothers’
labor-force participation in the months after the birth of a child71 and in the

See id. at QQ^W.
Mukhopadhyay’s einding that unpaid leave increases long-term labor force
participation for new mothers is not uncontroverted. For example, Natalie Goodpaster studies
the Family and Medical Leave Act of QRR^ (FMLA) and reaches a contrasting conclusion.
Focusing specieically on married mothers, she einds evidence that unpaid maternity leave led
more married mothers to leave the workforce in the long term. She suggests that mothers who
take leave may learn that they derive greater value from staying home with their children than
they expected, and that “[t]his effect can be compounded over time as more expecting married
mothers have social interaction with mothers who have already made the choice to stay out
of the labor force.” Natalie K. Goodpaster, Leaves and Leaving: The Family and Medical Leave
Act and the Decline in Maternal Labor Force Participation, QO BE J. ECON. ANAL. & POL’Y (ZOQO).
For our purposes, it does not whether Mukhopadhyay or Goodpaster is correct (and they could
both be correct—the QRaS and QRR^ laws may have had different consequences due to
different statutory features and different social and economic conditions). What matters is
that leave laws may have important effects—positive or negative—on future taxpaying
behavior that a comprehensive efeiciency analysis should take into account.
71 See Tanya S. Byker, Paid Parental Leave Laws in the United States: Does Short-Duration
Leave Affect Women’s Labor-Force Attachment?, QOd AM. ECON. REV. ZNZ (ZOQd).
69
70
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medium to long term,72 though evidence on the medium- and long-term effects
is not uniform.73
Analysis of paid parental leave differs from unpaid parental leave in that
paid leave is taxable (or more precisely, payments by employers to employees
on leave is included in gross income for federal income tax purposes74). Paid
leave mandates, though, provide for less than _,, percent wage replacement,75
so we can think of paid parental leave as a partly taxed, partly untaxed beneKit,
and therefore apply the same general framework as for unpaid leave. That is,
paid parental leave with a wage replacement rate of less than _,, percent
changes the compensation mix so that less of an employee’s compensation is
taxed (a negative effect on tax revenue), but likely increases future labor force
participation (a positive effect on tax revenue). As with unpaid leave, the Legal
Envelope Theorem suggests taking the resulting Kiscal externalities into
account when setting the rule.
Some analyses of paid leave—including one recent analysis by
congressional committee staff76—suggest that the latter effect predominates
and that the entire increase in economic output, or GDP, as a result of paid leave
should be counted as a beneKit. But as the Legal Envelope Theorem shows, an
analysis that includes the economic output of parents who remain in the
workforce as a beneKit while ignoring the value of the time stay-at-home
parents spend with their children does not provide an accurate picture of the

See, e.g., Charles L. Baum & Christopher J. Ruhm, The Effects of Paid Family Leave in
California on Labor Market Outcomes, ^W J. POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. ^^^ (ZOQd); Paul Gregg, Maria
Gutié rrez-Domè nech & Jane Waldfogel, The Employment of Married Mothers in Great Britain,
]^_`–bccc, aN ECONOMICA SNZ (ZOOa); Christopher J. Ruhm, The Economic Consequences of
Parental Leave Mandates: Lessons from Europe, QQ^ Q. J. ECON. ZSW (QRRS).
73 For a recent paper suggesting that paid leave may reduce long-term employment, see
Martha J. Bailey et al., The Long-Term Effects of California’s bcc` Paid Family Leave Act on
Women’s Careers: Evidence from U.S. Tax Data (Nat'l Econ. Research Bureau, Working Paper
No. ZdNQd, ZOQR), http://www.nber.org/papers/wZdNQd.
74 Zd U.S.C. § dQ(a)(Q).
75 See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CENTER, supra note dW, at Z tbl.Q.
76 Joint Econ. Comm., The Economic Beneeits of Paid Leave: Fact Sheet Z (n.d.).
72
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effect of paid leave on total resources. Public policy should support the choice
of parents to remain in the workforce—indeed, our argument here is that the
case for pro-work laws and policies is even stronger than a simple-efKiciency
analysis would suggest. But we should not proceed in our analysis as if the time
that parents spend at home with children is worthless to society.
The Legal Envelope Theorem provide a fuller picture of the resource
effects of changes in labor force participation resulting from changes in paidleave mandates. Consider again a new parent whose earnings would be X_,,x
and whose tax rate is `, percent. Imagine that the parent is on the fence
between remaining in the workforce and leaving (i.e., value that the parent
assigns to the care she can provide by staying at home is Xa,x). Assume that a
small change in the paid parental leave law (e.g., extending the leave that
employers must provide from _+ workweeks to _+ workweeks plus _
workday) would push the parent over the fence and cause her or him to remain
in the workforce. What is the effect on total resources?
The entire effect on economic output, or GDP (X_,,x), supplies the wrong
answer. Although the value of the parent’s output in the taxable sector has
increased by X_,,x, the value of her or his output in the untaxed sector has
declined by Xa,x. On the other hand, ignoring the effect on economic output
entirely will supply the wrong answer too. When the parent shifts from staying
at home to participating in the workforce, the government collects additional
tax revenue that can be used to provide valuable public goods. If the parent
fully internalizes the beneKits and costs of the choice to her or his child, then
the increase in total resources is the behavioral effect on tax revenue: here,
X`,x. If current leave laws fail to account for this tax-revenue effect, and if a
longer paid-leave period would lead to greater long-term labor force
attachment, then the Legal Envelope Theorem favors a change in the law
toward longer paid leave.
To be clear, workforce participation effects are far from the only factor to
consider in a policy analysis of paid parental leave. A full analysis should
account for possible positive effects on children’s health and educational
outcomes (to the extent those outcomes are not internalized by parents in
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their own behavioral choices).77 And insofar as paid parental leave results in
higher rates of female labor participation and career advancement, the
positive externalities from having more women in the workplace (and,
particularly, more women in leadership roles) must be factored in too.78 There
is a strong gender-equity case—apart from the tax-revenue case—for policies
that facilitate and encourage labor force participation and career advancement
among mothers. Said another way, whatever we would do to achieve genderegalitarian goals, we should do more because of the tax effects.
c. Job Protection and Wrongful Discharge
A central, and contested, area of workplace regulation is the set of laws
that regulate termination. There are numerous laws that regulate this choice,
including include civil service laws for federal and state employees, laws that
affect the power of public- and private-sector unions, employment
discrimination laws, state-level wrongful discharge laws, and judicial
doctrines that deviate from the common-law rule of employment at will.79
The most straightforward argument for these rules is that employees may
value limits on when they can be Kired more than their cost. Being Kired is
extremely disruptive to one’s life. While limitations on Kiring are costly to Kirms

For evidence that paid leave has positive effects on children’s health, see, for example,
Sakiko Tanaka, Parental Leave and Child Health in OECD Countries, QQW ECON. J. Fa (ZOOW). For
more ambiguous eindings, see Qian Liu & Nordstrom Skans, The Duration of Paid Parental
Leave and Children’s Scholastic Performance, QO B.E. J. ECON. ANAL. & POL’Y no. Q, art. ^ (ZOQO).
78 On the positive externalities provided by female managers to younger and less senior
female workers, see Geoffrey Tate & Liu Yang, Female Leadership and Gender Equity: Evidence
from Plant Closure, QQa J. FIN. ECON. aa (ZOQW).
79 Wrongful discharge laws come in a number of different forms including (Q) an implied
contract of no wrongful discharge; (Z) public policy against wrongful discharge in particular
circumstances; and (^) an implied duty of good faith. For a brief description of these doctrines
and a history of their development, see David H Autor, John J Donohue & Stewart J Schwab,
The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws, SS REV. ECON. STAT. ZQQ (ZOOd).
77
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and, therefore, may force Kirms to reduce pay, individuals may be willing to take
this trade-off.
We may need to laws imposing wrongful discharge rules rather than
relying on Kirms and employees to enter into them via employment contracts
because any single Kirm that offers wrongful discharge protections may attract
less desirable employees, a form of adverse selection.80 In addition, there is
evidence that employees have imperfect information about when they can be
Kired. They often believe that they cannot be Kired at will and instead can only
be Kired for some sort of misconduct.81 If this is true, employees may not
believe that they need to make a wrongful discharge limitation explicit in their
employment contracts.
Laws that provide employment security can be thought of as mandating a
term of employment, and the analysis above applies in a straightforward
fashion. Suppose that a particular level of wrongful discharge protection is
simple efKicient. Relative to slightly weaker protection, this rule will reduce
taxable compensation: what was previously taxable compensation now comes
in the form of the non-taxable utility beneKit from additional job security. If we
were to lower the discharge protection a little bit, the individual and her
employer would be no worse off. The relative portion of compensation paid in
taxable form, however, would go up, generating a social beneKit. As a result, we
should want somewhat less employment security than otherwise.
While the evidence is mixed, however, it appears that wrongful discharge
laws—one form of employment protection—reduce workplace participation
because employers are reluctant to hire workers that they cannot Kire.82 To the

80 David I. Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse
Selection, R J. LAB. ECON. ZRN (QRRQ).
81 See, e.g., Kim, supra note WS.
82 For example, one study einds that that employment (as a percent of population) goes
down by O.S% to Q.a% for states adopting the implied contract exception, with the effects most
pronounced for females and younger, less-educated workers. See David Autor, John Donohue
& Stewart J. Schwab, The Employment Consequences of Wrongful-Discharge Laws: Large, Small,
or None at All?, RN AM. ECON. REV. NNO (ZOON). On the other hand, Tom Miles einds not einds no
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extent this is true, wrongful discharge laws further reduce taxable
compensation. A small decrease in their strength would increase tax revenues
while not making workers or employers worse off.
In the parental leave case, the two effects—the mix of taxable versus nontaxable compensation holding market work constant, and the change in
taxable, market work—act in opposite directions. Taxable compensation as a
fraction of the total goes down but total work appears to go up. The Legal
Envelope Theorem suggests moving away from simple efKiciency based on the
net effect. In the wrongful discharge case, the two effects appear to work in the
same direction. The Legal Envelope Theorem in this case is clearer, suggesting
weaker protection from termination than the simple efKicient rule.
+. Laws Indirectly Affecting Work
The examples above involved laws whose nominal subject was work or
employment. Other laws whose subject matter is not nominally work or
employment, however, may also have substantial effects on work. Indeed, nonwork-related legal rules may have a greater effect on work levels than many
rules that directly regulate the work environment. In all of these cases, we
should deviate from the simple efKicient rule in the direction that increases
taxable compensation. Consider the following:
Zoning and land use: Zoning and other rules regulating land use affect
where businesses and homes are located relative to one another. Their relative
location determines, in part, the length of commutes, which in turn affects the
cost of working. Zoning and land use rules also in part determine the type of
building or other amenities of the workplace and the amenities surrounding

effects on employment levels but does eind that employers increase their use of temporaryhelp agency workers. See Thomas J. Miles, Common Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and
U.S. Labor Markets, Qd J. L. ECON. ORG. aN (ZOOO). Autor, Donohue, and Schwab argue that the
difference in results is due to Miles’s reliance on a system of classifying case law developments
that often records a later date for state-level changes than the date at which those changes
eirst emerged.
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the workplace. For example, working in an ofKice park is different than working
in a dense urban environment and that is different from working in an area
zoned for heavy industry. While zoning and land use rules involve a host of
complex set of considerations, one important effect is on work. To the extent
zoning and land use rules affect work, they generate Kiscal externalities which
should be taken into account when setting those rules.
Transportation: Legal rules also directly govern how people commute. For
example, driving laws affect the length of a commute and its safety. They affect
the type of vehicle that can be used for commuting and whether carpooling is
desirable.83 Laws regulating the vehicles themselves affect the cost of
commuting as well as the commuting experience. To the extent they these legal
rules change the amount of work individuals do, they have a Kiscal externality
that should be taken into account.
Leisure: The regulation of leisure activities is extensive.84 For example,
laws regulate the safety of various leisure activities (e.g., bicycle helmet laws).
They determine what sorts of leisure activities one may engage in (e.g., alcohol
laws). They determine the costs of many leisure activities (e.g., laws regulating
the movie industry). Making leisure activities more attractive unfortunately
generates a negative Kiscal externality which means we should be slightly less
willing to make leisure attractive than otherwise.
Spending. So far we have focused on non-tax legal rules that affect the
workplace, but—as suggested by Corlett and Hague—non-tax subsidies for
complements to labor affect work decisions too, and should be adjusted in light
of tax considerations. For example, government subsidies for childcare and
early childhood education have potentially signiKicant consequences not only

The distinction between law and spending is especially fraught in this context. Speed
limits and HOV lanes are “laws” while an additional lane of road surface is “spending.” Both
affect commutes.
84 The inestimable Journal of Leisure Research provides numerous articles illustrating the
point.
83
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for children’s outcomes,85 but also for the labor supply choices of their parents
(and, particularly, mothers).86 As with paid parental leave, the tax effects
reinforce egalitarian goals of increasing women’s labor force participation and
earnings. Public transit subsidies also appear to have positive employment
effects, and, therefore, we should spend more on public transit than simple
efKiciency would suggest.87
`. Summary
The workplace is a legally constructed environment. The regulation of
work is pervasive. As such, legal rules affect the costs and beneKits of work. The
regulation of non-work activities is also pervasive, and these regulations affect
the costs of work as well. As a result, the elasticity of labor supply should be
thought of as, in part, a choice, rather than an exogenously given variable. Legal
rules surrounding work and leisure should be designed with a view to the tax
revenue consequences. They should deviate from simple efKiciency, possibly
signiKicantly, because of these considerations.
B.

Legal Rules Affecting Business Organizations

Even more so than for work, the law shapes business entities. Their very
existence is created by law—they are legal Kictions. Their governance, their

For a recent analysis of the costs and beneeits of universal subsidized child care, see
Tarjei Havnes & Magne Mogstad, Is Universal Child Care Leveling the Playing Field?, QZa J. PUB.
ECON. QOO (ZOQW).
86 For example, Jonah Gelbach einds signieicant positive effects on women’s employment
from the introduction of schooling for W-year olds (kindergarten) on women’s employment.
Jonah B. Gelbach, Public Schooling for Young Children and Maternal Labor Supply, RZ AM. ECON.
REV. ^Oa (ZOOZ). Other studies, however, eind more mixed results. Compare Stefan
Bauernschuster & Martin Schlotter, Public Child Care and Mothers’ Labor Supply—Evidence
from Two Quasi-Experiments, QZ^ J. PUB. ECON. Q (ZOQW) (einding an effect in Germany). with
Tarjei Havnes & Magne Mogstad, Money for Nothing? Universal Child Care and Maternal
Employment, RW J. PUB. ECON. QNWW (ZOQQ) (einding no effect in Norway).
87 See, e.g., Paul M. Ong & Douglas Houston, Transit, Employment and Women on Welfare,
Z^ J. URB. GEOGRAPHY ^NN (ZOQ^).
85
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capital structure, the relationship between owners and the Kirm, the
relationships between suppliers and the Kirm, the size of Kirm, the information
they must collect and that they must disclose, and numerous other aspects of
their operations are shaped by the law. Many of these legal choices have
important effects on the tax system.
The analysis of the way that business law affects the tax system is, in a
basic sense, the same as the analysis of legal rules affecting work: we want legal
rules to deviate from simple efKiciency in order to favor higher-tax activities.
For example, debt is generally taxed at a lower rate than equity, so we want
legal rules to favor equity more than simple efKiciency would suggest.
A key problem with analyzing the interaction of business law and taxes is
that the tax rules governing business organizations are likely far from their
optimum and can themselves be reformed. For example, rather than shifting
the non-tax legal rules to reduce the use of debt, we could Kix the tax rules to
eliminate the distinction between debt and equity, eliminating the distortion
without changing non-tax legal rules.88 To keep the analysis simple, we assume
that the tax rules are, in the short term, largely Kixed, and discuss how legal
rules interact with them, with the understanding that the optimal policy likely
involves changes to both tax rules and legal rules.
We consider three areas where legal rules intersect the tax rules governing
business organizations: (i) debt versus equity, (ii) the choice of legal entity, and
(iii) the rules governing distributions. These three items are the three major
distortions caused by the corporate tax, as identiKied by the Treasury
Department’s study of major corporate tax reform.89

88 See, for example, the proposal by the Treasury Department to eliminate the distinction.

U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS, TAXING
BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (QRRZ).
89 Id. The American Law Institute recognized a similar set of distortions. AM. LAW INST.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES,
REPORTER’S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION (QRR^).
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_. Debt/Equity Rules

Leverage—the use of debt rather than equity—reduces the tax on
corporations because corporations can deduct interest payments made to
lenders but not dividend payments made to shareholders.90 As a result, the
Treasury Department study concluded that the tax law creates an incentive to
capitalize corporations with debt rather than equity.
The economic difference between debt and equity is that debt—
borrowing—is typically characterized by a mandatory requirement to repay a
Kixed amount at a Kixed time, while equity is typically characterized by a return
contingent on the performance of the business.91 Businesses have some
optimal mix of these two instruments in their capital structure.
Legal rules affect this choice. The bankruptcy law and the law of secured
transactions affects the ability of a corporation to use debt. In addition,
securities laws affect the cost of issuing debt and of issuing equity in public or
in private markets. Banking laws affect the ability of businesses to get bank
loans. That is, “debt” and “equity” are relationship determined by legal rules

The net tax beneeit of leverage to the corporation also depends on the tax treatment of
the lenders as compared to shareholders. Large pools of capital, particularly foreign capital
and capital owned by pension funds, are not taxed under U.S. law, which means that interest
payments are not taxed at all while earnings distributed as dividends are taxed at the
corporate level.
The American Law Institute study of corporate integration emphasizes that the
preference for debt, if any, depends on the relative tax rates of lenders and shareholders as
well as the corporate-level treatment. ALVIN WARREN, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE INCOME TAXES, REPORTER’S STUDY OF CORPORATE INTEGRATION (QRR^). With low enough
tax rates on dividends and on corporate income, the preference may be reversed—the tax law
may generate a preference for equity.
91 In reality, the line between debt and equity is almost impossible to draw. Debt can be
contingent and depend in part on the performance of the business and equity can have
required eixed payments. But in the prototypical cases, the difference between the two is
relatively clear.
90
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(as well as by the terms of the instruments themselves). Therefore, the ability
of a corporation to use debt depends on legal choices.
The analysis of how legal rules and the tax system interact is roughly the
same as above, which is that we want to shift away from the simple efKicient
set of legal rules governing debt and equity to favor equity. Rather than repeat
this analysis, we illustrate the interaction with an actual case where a legal rule
was changed in response to tax issues.
Banks are required to meet what are known as capital requirements.
These are requirements that a certain portion of their capital structure be
made up of Kinancial instruments that do not require immediate repayment—
they are long-term claims rather than claims with rigid, Kixed payment
schedules. Common stock is the paradigmatic form of bank capital because it
never needs to be repaid.
The reason for the capital requirement, as laid out in work by Douglas
Diamond and Raghuram Rajan, is to reduce the probability of Kinancial
distress.92 A secure cushion of capital means that banks are more likely to be
able to make mandatory payments on the debt that they issue. The cost of bank
capital requirements is that they reduce one of the core functions of banks,
which is issuing short-term, liquid notes that can act as money in a modern
Kinancial system. The higher the capital requirement, the less a bank can
provide liquidity to the market. Simple-efKicient capital rules balance these
costs against the beneKits.
A capital requirement needs a deKinition of “capital.” Most countries follow
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision guidelines, classifying capital
into Tier _ and Tier +, with Tier _ being preferred.93 The Basel Committee

92

Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, A Theory of Bank Capital, WW J. FIN. ZN^Q

(ZOOO).
For the most recent version, see BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE BASEL FRAMEWORK
(ZOQR), https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/index.htm.
93
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provides a complex set of rules that determine how much of any given Kinancial
instrument counts toward each tier.
As noted, common stock is the paradigm of Tier _ capital. If a bank uses
common stock as its Tier _ capital, however, it loses the beneKit of the interest
deduction. Therefore, a central tax planning goal for banks is to structure a
Kinancial instrument that qualiKies as Tier _ capital for bank regulatory
purposes yet is treated as debt for tax purposes. It is the Holy Grail of bank tax
planning.
In the mid-_jj,s, tax planners almost reached the Holy Grail through an
exotic tax structure known as “Reverse MIPS.”94 The basic idea was to issue
preferred stock (which counted as Tier _ capital) to a partnership and have the
partnership issue debt secured by the preferred stock. For tax purposes, the
partnership is a pass-through entity, which means that the interest deductions
on the debt Klowed through to the bank. (The dividends on the preferred stock
used to pay the interest on the debt were treated as a nothing for tax purposes
because the bank was treated as just paying itself.) For bank regulatory and
accounting purposes, however, the partnership was treated as an independent
entity, which means that the debt was not treated as bank debt. Instead, the
bank was treated has having merely issued preferred stock to the independent
partnership. Therefore, the bank was treated as having issued Tier _ capital for
bank regulatory purposes but debt for tax purposes.95

MIPS, or Monthly Income Preferred Stock, was a einancial instrument designed to
generate most of the features of equity while allowing an interest deduction for tax purposes.
MIPS was widely used by non-einancial corporations but did not satisfy the capital
requirements for banks. Reverse MIPS is a variant on MIPS which effectively reversed or
elipped upside down the basic structure. On MIPS and Reverse MIPS, see generally Mark P.
Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The InDluence of Tax Law on Securities Innovation in the United States:
]^h]-]^^_, WZ TAX L. REV. QQR, QW^-QWN & nn.QZR-^O (QRRa).
95 For further background on the Reverse MIPS saga, see Tom Pratt, IRS Notice on MIPS
Leaves Basic Structure Unscathed; But Some Variations Clearly Won’t Work, INV. DEALERS’
DIGEST, Apr. ZW, QRRN, at QZ.
94
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Before any Reverse MIPS were issued, however, the Treasury found out
about them. Immediately upon hearing of these instruments, the Treasury
issued a public notice, Notice j)-)h, stating that the government would
challenge the intended tax treatment of these instruments, should any of them
be issued.96 The Notice laid out a number of theories of why the instruments
did not generate an interest deduction for tax purposes. The banks’ tax
advisors disagreed, and the banks were prepared to issue the instruments. The
Notice, however, effectively acted to inform the bank regulators of the tax
problem the instruments generated. In response, the bank regulators
determined that they would not allow the instruments to be classiKied as Tier
_ capital, effectively preventing banks from issuing them.97
We can think about how the bank regulators acted in terms of the Legal
Envelope Theorem. Before they focused on the tax effects and risks, the bank
regulators thought that the proper legal rule was to classify Reverse MIPS as
Tier _ capital. That is, they classiKied the instrument based on Basel
Committee’s rules that determined the trade-off between liquidity creation
and safety. The determination that Reverse MIPS was Tier _ capital was simple
efKicient.98 Declining to classify them as Tier _ was a small move away from

96 Notice RN-NS, QRRN-Q.C.B. ^Wa. The government described the core problem as follows:
The Internal Revenue Service is aware of proposed transactions designed to provide
corporations with signieicant tax advantages in satisfying their equity capital requirements.
Although the details may vary, these transactions are intended to give the issuing corporations
the tax beneeits of issuing debt even though the corporations actually issue stock. In addition,
the instruments are intended to be treated as equity for regulatory, rating agency, or einancial
accounting purposes.
97 An interesting contrast to this story is the regulatory actions behind Cottage Savings v.
Commissioner, NRR U.S. WWN (QRRQ). There, bank regulators—the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board—actively help banks generate tax deductions for losses while avoiding the regulatory
and accounting implications of those losses.
98 The Basel Committee’s rules may have been elawed, in which case, the bank regulator’s
decision would also have been elawed. To keep reality from getting in the way of a good yarn,
we ignore this possibility. More seriously, all the legal and tax choices in this sort of complex
environment are difeicult ones. We are using this history as an example of the types of
interactions between the laws governing business organizations and taxes rather than
attempting to make deeinitive statements about the optimal content of particular rules.
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simple efKiciency that generated positive tax beneKits. Indeed, the tax beneKits
were likely signiKicant because Reverse MIPS and similar structures could have
eliminated a substantial portion of the tax base for Kinancial institutions. The
regulators choose the fully efKicient rule rather than the simple efKicient rule,
consistent with the recommendation of the Legal Envelope Theorem.
+. Choice of Entity
The corporate tax may distort the choice of business entities. In particular,
businesses may avoid using the corporate form to avoid the double-level
corporate tax. The _jj+ Treasury Department study of the corporate tax
argued that distortions in the choice of organizational form generated
signiKicant social losses, as businesses used otherwise suboptimal
structures.99 For example, a business that would have operated efKiciently as a
corporation might choose to be a partnership because of the tax cost of
incorporation.
The ability of businesses to choose their form, and how that choice affects
the operation of the business, depend almost entirely on the legal rules that
govern business entities. Corporations, general and limited partnerships, and
limited liability companies are all creatures of law. We can choose their
attributes. Whether businesses choose to operate through the higher-taxed or
lower-taxed form will depend, in part, on the non-tax attributes that the law
assigns to each form. We cannot even begin to understand whether, and the
extent to which, the tax incentive to choose particular forms of business
organizations generates social losses without understanding the underlying
law.
As with debt versus equity, we illustrate the interaction with an historical
incident, the _jaa invention of the limited liability corporation and the tax
response, known as check-the-box. The LLC was created as a response to the
corporate tax. It is an example of the non-tax legal rules taking taxation into
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See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., supra note SS, at ^-N, QQZ-QW.
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account. As we will discuss, states probably made the wrong choice because of
free-rider incentives—the invention of the LLC probably had a negative
BETR—but regardless of merits of the states’ actions, the story shows how
legal choices regarding what entities should exist and their attributes affect the
tax system.
To understand the invention of the LLC, we must review how the tax law
classiKied business entities at the time of their invention. The tax rules were
(and remain) asymmetric. If a business was organized under state law as a
corporation, the entity was treated as a corporation for tax purposes. But if a
business was organized under state law as some other legal form, such as a
partnership, the entity might be characterized for tax purposes as either
partnership or a corporation.100
To draw the distinction between partnerships and corporations (for
entities that did not use a state law corporate form), the tax law used a “looks
like” test, known colloquially as the four-factor test. Under this test, if the entity
had enough features of a platonic corporation, it was taxed as a corporation.101
In particular, platonic corporations were said to have four factors: (i)
continuity of life (i.e., death of a shareholder does not cause the corporation to
cease to exist); (ii) centralization of management; (iii) limited liability; and (iv)
free transferability of interests. Partnerships were said to lack these attributes.
Recognizing that there was Klexibility in structuring entities—for example, a
partnership could hire a centralized manager rather than being run by the
partners themselves—the regulations treated an entity as a corporation if it
had at least three of the four factors.

Technically, corporations are deeined in section aaQO(a)(^) to include “associations,
joint stock companies, and insurance companies.” This provision has been read to mean that
any entity that is actually a state-law corporation is a corporation for tax purposes. In addition,
entities that are “association” are also tax corporations. The question is what it means to be
an association.
101 Treas. Reg. Q.aaOQ-Z. Regulations build on Morrisey v. United States, ZRd U.S. ^NN
(QR^W), and United States v. Kintner, ZQd F.Zd NQS (Rth Cir. QRWN).
100
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The four-factor test meant that the corporate tax was in part a tax on the
use of these factors in addition to a tax on the choice of entity. That is, the
corporate tax fell on (_) the choice to use the corporate form and (+) the use a
sufKicient number of the four factors. To the extent that the tax fell on the use
of the corporate form, it fell on a legal Kiction. To the extent it fell on the four
factors and to the extent they represented underlying economic arrangements,
it fell on economic choices (though to some extent, the four factors were
formalistic legal arrangements rather than true economic arrangements).
SufKiciently clever lawyers were able to manipulate the four factors to
achieve most of what their clients wanted for non-tax legal purposes while
getting their preferred tax law treatment.102 For example, lawyers were able to
create publicly traded entities that were treated as partnerships for tax
purposes, allowing businesses to access public capital markets without having
to pay the corporate tax. In response, Congress changed the tax law to treat
most publicly traded entities as corporations regardless of their other
attributes.103 Lawyers could also give partnerships limited liability for the
most part, by making a modestly capitalized corporation the general partner
in a limited partnership.
The Kinal push to take advantage of the four-factor test involved a change
to state law rather than structuring within existing law: Wyoming enacted the
Kirst limited liability company statute in _jaa.104 An LLC, unlike a limited
partnership, does not require any partner to have unlimited liability.
Nevertheless, Wyoming LLCs were able to be treated as partnerships under

For a history, see Victor E. Fleischer, Note, If It Looks Like a Duck: Corporate
Resemblance and Check-the-Box Elective Tax ClassiDication, Rd COLUM. L. REV. WQS (QRRd). For a
list of additional sources on this issue, see David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing Doctrine and
EfDiciency in the Tax Law, SN CORNELL L. REV. QdZa, Qd^R n.Q^ (QRRS).
103 I.R.C. § aaON.
104 See Act of March N, QRaa, ch. QWW, QRaa Wyo. Sess. Laws WQZ.
102
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the four-factor test.105 In effect, LLCs had the most important state law
attributes of a corporation but qualiKied as partnerships for tax purposes.
The IRS was initially unsure how to treat LLCs, and considered forcing
them to be treated as corporations. After a number of years of deliberation,
however, the IRS basically just gave up. It made the choice whether to be a
corporation or a partnership elective (unless the entity is a state law
corporation or is publicly traded). Entities simply “check the box” to determine
how they are treated for tax purposes.106 That is, the state law change so
drastically altered the relevant elasticity that it made the tax rule impossible
to enforce. And while we cannot tie it directly to the invention of the LLC (there
could be a number contributing factors), the fraction of business income in
corporate form has fallen dramatically in the last several decades.107
Like the saga of Reverse MIPs, the LLC story illustrates the tax revenue
effects of non-tax legal rules regarding business organizations. But unlike,
Reverse MIPs, the advent of the LLC was a move in precisely the wrong
direction.108 Making the choice of entity easier most likely created a negative
Kiscal externality. The Legal Envelope Theorem, by contrast, counsels for

See Rev. Rul. SS-ad, QRSS-Z C.B. ^dO. The Service held that a Wyoming LLC only had
two of the attributes of a corporation: centralized management and limited liability. But
because a Wyoming LLC would dissolve upon the death or exit of any member, it did not have
the corporate characteristic of continuity of life. And because a full transfer of a membership
interest—along with all the attributes of membership—required the remaining members’
approval, a Wyoming LLC did not have the corporate characteristic of free transferability of
interests. Because a Wyoming LLC satiseied only two prongs of the four-factor test, the IRS
ruled that it was partnership and not a corporation. See id. Following the advent of the
Wyoming LLC, all states would ultimately adopt their own LLC statutes. See Howard M.
Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution—The Social Cost of Academic Neglect, ^S CREIGHTON L. REV.
^W, RZ-Rd app. (ZOON).
106 Treas. Reg. ^OQ.aaOQ-^.
107 Matthew Smith, Danny Yagan, Owen Zidar & Eric Zwick, Capitalists in the Twenty-First
Century, Q^N Q. J. ECON. QdaW (ZOQR).
108 The likely reason for this move in the wrong direction was that states were trying to
externalize costs to other states, in effective a Wo-player prisoner’s dilemma game.
105
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adjusting legal rules to make it more costly to avoid taxation rather than
making it easier.109
Stepping back from the speciKics of the LLC case study, the discussion here
illustrates a more general point about the interaction between the tax system
and non-tax legal rules regarding choice of organizational form. Non-tax law
provides business enterprises with a menu of organizational forms from which
they can choose.110 The tax system must decide how to treat each of these
organizational forms. The tax system can strive for rough equivalence across
forms, but in a complex tax system, it is likely (if not inevitable) that the use of
some forms will be tax-advantageous relative to other forms for particular
enterprises under certain circumstances. Setting tax considerations aside,
there is likely to be some efKicient number of forms and some efKicient set of
rules regarding the ease with which enterprises can change their form.111 The
more options there are, and the easier it is to move across them, the likelier it
is that any particular enterprise will be able to shift to a form that reduces its
or its owners’ taxes. If we would otherwise have a menu that satisKies simple
efKiciency, we should adjust it so as to reduce the number of options and/or
make it somewhat harder to switch among them. Doing so will not lead to any
Kirst-order loss in efKiciency but will increase tax revenues. The LLC revolution
illustrates one way that state law regarding business organizations can be
adjusted to affect tax revenues. Unfortunately, it appears that states made
precisely the wrong adjustment.

For an argument along these lines, see David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on
Tax Planning, QOQ COLUM. LAW REV. Q^QZ (ZOOQ). The BETR provides a precise characterization
of the social beneeits of frictions.
110 The menu could be provided by private-sector sources, though the state is the sole
supplier in virtually every modern market economy. See Gillian Hadeield & Eric Talley, On
Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law, ZZ J. L. ECON. & ORG. NQN (ZOOd).
111 The cognitive cost of too many menu options is familiar to anyone who has struggled
to decide what to order at a diner. See Roberto A. Ferdman, Americans Are Tired of Long
Restaurant
Menus,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
QS,
ZOQN),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/ZOQN/OR/QS/americans-are-tired-oflong-restaurant-menus.
109
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`. Distributions

The Kinal distortion created by the two-level corporate highlighted by the
Treasury study concerns the timing and form of corporate distributions.112
The economics underlying this distortion are far more complex than those
regarding the choice of entity or the use of leverage, and aspects of the
economics are still not well understood.113 In the interest of brevity, we use a
purposefully simpliKied illustrative version of the law, with the understanding
that a more complete analysis might lead to different conclusions.
The tax law has always treated dividends and share repurchases
(buybacks) differently. Although the differences are complex, buybacks are
generally preferred under current law, relative to dividends.114 The key
reasons are that buybacks have somewhat more favorable basis recovery rules
and that buybacks may facilitate the streaming or targeting of distributions to
low-taxed shareholders, allowing high-tax shareholders to defer their taxes or
possibly eliminate them through stepped-up basis at death.115 Under the law
prior to +,,`, buybacks were more clearly preferred because they were taxed
at a lower rate than dividends.116

112

See U.S DEP’T OF THE TREAS., supra note SS, at QQW-QS.

113 For example, see David A. Weisbach, Capital Gains Taxation and Corporate Investment,

aO NAT’L TAX J. dZQ (ZOQa).
114 For a canonical treatment of the subject, see Marvin A. Chirelstein, Optional
Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the Repurchase of Common Shares, aS YALE L.J. a^R
(QRdR).
115 For example, imagine a corporation with two shareholders, one who is old (and whose
heirs will soon be able to take advantage of stepped-up basis at her death) and the other who
is young and healthy. A dividend has to be paid pro rata to both types while a share repurchase
can be targeted only at the young and healthy shareholder. The older shareholder can wait to
receive her share of the earnings until she dies, at which point those earnings will not be taxed
because of the basis step-up. Section ^OW(b) prevents this kind of streaming with dividends
(for example, by creating two classes of stock, one which pays dividends and one which does
not). See I.R.C. § ^OW(b).
116 Prior to the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of ZOO^, Pub. L. No. QOS-Za,
QQa Stat. aWZ, dividends were generally taxed as ordinary income, while buybacks were taxed
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The most relevant legal rule governing the choice between dividends and
buybacks is the safe harbor from market manipulation liability under sections
j(a)(+) and _,(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of _j`).117 In _jh+, the
Securities and Exchange Commission issued a safe harbor that made it easier
for corporations to use buybacks without violating market manipulation
rules.118 To qualify for the Rule _,b-_h safe harbor, an issuer that buys back its
shares on the open market generally must (among other requirements) halt its
repurchases during a `,-minute blackout period before the close of the trading
session, and the issuer’s aggregate purchases for the day cannot exceed +Y
percent of the stock’s average daily trading volume.119
Since that time, there has been a relatively consistent trend toward the use
of buybacks such that buybacks are now a larger share of corporate
distributions than dividends.120 There is a substantial literature in Kinance
attempting to explain the choice between dividends and buybacks.121 The
literature argues that dividends carry a signal about strong future earnings
while buybacks do not. This makes dividends more expensive but also more
meaningful. In particular, the economic literature argues that corporations will
only increase their dividends if they can sustain the increase over the long
term. They will use buybacks for short-term increases in distributions.

as sales of capital assets potentially eligible for the preferential tax rate on long-term capital
gains. In the immediate run-up to the ZOO^ law, the gap between these two rates was wide:
the ordinary income tax rate was ^W percent, while the long-term capital gains rate was ZO
percent. Under the ZOO^ law, most dividends paid by U.S. corporations are taxed at the same
preferential rate as long-term capital gains. See I.R.C. § Q(h)(QQ).
117 Ch. NON, tit. I, §§ R(a)(Z), QO(b), NS Stat. SRQ (codieied at QW U.S.C. §§ aSi(a)(Z), aSj(b)).
118 Qa C.F.R. ZNO.QOb-QS; see also Securities Exchange Act Release No. QRZNN, Na Fed. Reg.
W^^^^, W^^^N (Nov. Zd, QRSZ). The rule was updated in ZOO^. See Securities Exchange Act
Release No. NSadd, dS Fed. Reg. dNRWZ (Nov. Qa, ZOO^).
119 Qa C.F.R. ZNO.QOb-QS(b)(Z)(iii), (N).
120 Edward Yardeni, Joe Abbott & Mali Quintana, Corporate Finance Brieeing: S&P WOO
Buybacks
&
Dividends
R
eig.QO
(Aug.
a,
ZOZO),
https://www.yardeni.com/pub/buybackdiv.pdf.
121 See Franklin Allen & Roni Michaely, Payout Policy, in Q HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF
FINANCE ^^a (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & René M. Stulz eds., ZOO^).
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The legal rule—SEC Rule _,b-_h—that mediates the choice between
buybacks and dividends can be changed, and doing so will have tax
implications. For instance, the SEC could extend the blackout period from `,
minutes to `_ minutes, or reduce the average daily trading volume cap from +Y
percent to +) percent. If those rules were previously set to satisfy simple
efKiciency, then small changes will not have Kirst-order effects except for their
tax revenue consequences. And nudging Kirms away from buybacks and toward
dividends is likely to raise tax revenue, thus increasing total resources
available to society.
There have been a number of legislative proposals in the last several years
to impose limits on buybacks, though, for the most part, these would entail
discrete rather than marginal changes.122 The motivations for these proposals
are generally tangential to taxation,123 and our discussion does not amount to
an endorsement of any of them. Regardless, what these proposals do show is
that legal rules can affect the choice between dividends and buybacks. The
dividend-buyback margin is thus another area where the Legal Envelope
Theorem can guide policy.
C.

Rules Affecting the Informal Economy

A central problem affecting tax collection in many nations is that a large
portion of their economy is in the informal sector. Estimating the size of the

122 See, e.g., Reward Work Act, S. RQW, QQdth Cong. (ZOQR) (sponsored by Senator Baldwin)

(proposing to abrogate Rule QOb-QS). See generally Jay B. Sykes, Cong. Research Serv., Stock
Buybacks: Background and Reform Proposals (Feb. Za, ZOQR) (providing overview of proposals
and their rationales).
123 Some buyback critics argue that buybacks divert capital from long-term investments,
though this criticism is highly questionable. See Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Are
Buybacks Really Shortchanging Investment?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar-Apr. ZOQS) (casting doubt on
this rationale). Others argue that buybacks can facilitate insider trading. See, e.g., Robert J.
Jackson, Jr., Letter on Stock Buybacks and Insiders’ Cashouts, HARV. LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Mar. S, ZOQR). A related argument is that buybacks exacerbate inequality, though
the causal underpinnings of this claim are somewhat hazy. See, e.g., William Lazonick, ProDits
Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. ZOQN).
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informal economy is difKicult because informal activity is, by its nature, hidden.
By almost any measure, however, it is large.124 According to the International
Labour Organization, more than m, percent of the world’s employed
population work in the informal economy.125 In some countries, such as Haiti,
Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, the informal economy accounts for more than half of
GDP.126 Even in the United States, which has proportionately one of the
smallest shadow sectors in the world, the informal economy still accounted for
a percent of GDP in +,_Y.127
There is a tight correlation between the share of taxes (as a percent of
GDP) and economic development: highly developed economies collect a large
shares of GDP in taxes, while less developed economies collect a low share in
taxes.128 This is caused in part by the large size of the informal sector in
developing countries. Countries with large informal sectors cannot tax large
portions of the economy. But causation likely goes in the other direction as
well: countries that raise less revenue will lack the administrative capacity to
enforce taxes or to provide public goods, which means that they will have a
larger informal economy.

Friedrich Schneider & Dominik H. Enste, Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and
Consequences, ^S J. ECON. LIT. aa (ZOOO); Dominik H. Enste, Regulation and Shadow Economy:
Empirical Evidence For bj OECD-Countries, ZQ CONST. POLIT. ECON. Z^Q (ZOQO); FRIEDRICH
SCHNEIDER & DOMINIK H. ENSTE, THE SHADOW ECONOMY: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY (ZOQ^).
125 Press Release, Int’l Labour Org., More Than kc Per Cent of the World’s Employed
Population Are in the Informal Economy (Apr. ^O, ZOQS), https://www.ilo.org/global/aboutthe-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_dZaQSR/lang--en/index.htm.
126 See Leandro Medina & Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economies Around the World:
What Did We Learn Over the Last bc Years dR-ad tbl.A.Q (Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Working
Paper
QS/Qa,
Jan.
ZOQS),
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/WP/ZOQS/wpQSQa.ashx.
127 Id. at ad tbl.A.Q.
128 According to Timothy Belsley and Torten Perrson, low-income countries collect taxes
of between QO to ZO percent of GDP while high-income countries collect taxes of around NO
percent. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little?, ZS J.
ECON. PERSP. RR (ZOQN).
124
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Citizens of developed countries generally take the capacity to tax as a
given. Tax debates center around the proper tax base or the appropriate level
of progressivity. The capacity to tax, however, is a central problem of the wellbeing of residents of developing countries. Governments without adequate tax
revenues cannot provide the necessary institutions, such as an impartial
justice system, or public goods such as roads, access to clean water, and
physical security. The informal economy and the resulting effects on taxation
are a Kirst order problem for billions of people around the world.129
We explore two examples of legal rules that can affect the size of the
informal economy: rules that raise the cost of transacting in cash (and thus the
cost of informality), and rules that reduce the cost of Kinancial services (and
thus the cost of formality). Changes to these rules to improve the functioning
of the tax system are likely to have their greatest impact in developing
countries, where the informal sector is larger. All countries, however, face
problems of informality to some extent, and our analysis applies to advanced
as well as developing economies.

There is an ongoing debate about the reasons for informality. In a recent survey,
Rafael La Porta and Andrei Shleifer suggest three different lines of argument. In one,
epitomized by the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, the informal economy is held back
by government regulation or by insecure property rights—by legal rules. Under this theory,
adjusting those rules, such as by reducing barriers to entry or by providing a better system of
property rights, will generate a shift to the formal sector, generating growth. Not incidentally
for our purposes, changing these legal rules would generate more tax revenue. Another theory
is that informal eirms stay informal to avoid taxes and regulation, which means that the right
approach to reducing informality is better enforcement. Legal rules can still play a role. By
reducing the costs of formality and increasing the beneeits, changes to legal rules can reduce
the incentives of eirms to stay informal. Finally, eirms may be informal because they are simply
less productive than formal eirms, which means that they lack the incentives to become larger
and to join the informal economy. The informal economy shrinks as human capital grows and
people become more productive. This last theory, which is La Porta’s and Shleifer’s preferred
theory, leaves a smaller role for legal rules. Rafael La Porta & Andrei Shleifer, Informality and
Development, ZS J. ECON. PERSP.. QOR (ZOQN).
129
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_. Raising the Cost of Cash

Cash is a central component of the informal economy. Cash is used for
relatively benign activities, such as by informal vendors that abound in
developing economies. Cash is also central to far less benign activities. In a
recent book on the effects of cash, Kenneth Rogoff observes that cash is central
to drug trafKicking, racketeering, extortion, corruption, human trafKicking, and
money laundering.130
Governments have to make choices about what types of cash they should
issue. In a sense, the choice of cash denominations is a formal legal rule—it is
a decision about what bills and coins qualify as legal tender. Large cash
transactions will be extraordinarily costly if, for example, a government allows
only one-unit notes (e.g., one-dollar bills). Conversely, the cost of cash
transactions will likely be quite high as well if a government printed notes of
every possible denomination (_-unit, +-unit, `-unit, and so on, all the way up
to a very large number, thus requiring individuals to engage in involved
arithmetic exercises every time they buy anything). Governments must
balance these competing considerations in determining the optimal number
of note types and the corresponding denominations.
A sizeable scholarly literature in economics, operations research, and
related Kields seeks to specify the optimal denomination structure for bank
notes and coins. Leo van Hove characterizes the optimal denomination
structure as a multicriteria optimization problem in which the most important
criterion is the “principle of least effort”: the settlement of transactions should
involve as few notes and coins as possible. Other criteria include compatibility
with the decimal system (to make mental arithmetic easier); “surveyability”
(the idea that the number of denominations should be small enough that
members of the public can easily recognize and sort the different
denominations by size, shape, color, image, etc.); and the minimization of

130

KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH Z (ZOQd).
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central-bank production costs.131 Consequences for the size of the informal
economy are largely left out of the optimal-denomination-structure literature.
Now suppose that a government comes to understand the nefarious role
of cash, such as in human trafKicking, drug sales, and the like. Many of the
activities listed above rely on relatively large denomination notes. As Rogoff
documents, the X_,, bill is the most important unit of currency globally for
these activities, but in any given country, large denomination notes may play a
role in domestic transactions.132 If we leave aside taxes for a moment, the
government should want to reduce the circulation of large denomination notes
to reduce nefarious activities associated with these notes. Whatever the right
balance of different types of currency was desirable absent concerns about
illegal activities, it should shift toward smaller denomination notes once
concerns about illegal activities are taken into account.
Tax enters the calculus in much the same way. As Rogoff demonstrates,
large denomination notes are important for tax evasion. Unlike most other
forms of payment, they are largely untraceable (except, quite imperfectly,
through serial numbers). The government should reduce the availability of
large denomination notes because of the opportunities for tax evasion that
they create.
India followed this logic in November +,_m by making all Y,, and _,,,,
rupee notes (hm percent of all cash then in circulation in the country) invalid
as legal tender. To prevent criminals from planning around the

See Leo Van Hove, Optimal Denominations for Coins and Bank Notes: In Defense of the
Principle of Least Effort, ^^ J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING QOQW, QOQR (ZOOQ); see also Y. Bouhdaoui,
D. Bounie & L. Van Hove, Central Banks and Their Banknote Series: The EfDiciency-Cost Tradeoff, ZS ECON. MODELING QNSZ (ZOQQ) (arguing that transactional-efeiciency gains must be
weighed against central-bank production costs); Yassine Bouhdaoui & Leo Van Hove, On the
Socially Optimal Density of Coin and Banknote Series: Do Production Costs Really Matter?, WZ J.
MACROECON. ZWZ (ZOQa) (arguing that central banks could achieve substantial transactionalefeiciency gains with small incremental production costs by increasing the number of
denominations).
132 See ROGOFF, supra note Q^O, at ^Q–^Z.
131
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demonetization, the announcement was a surprise and took effect at midnight
the next day. In his address to the nation, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said
that the ban would reduce the use of fake notes, thus cutting off a funding
source for terrorists who derive income from counterfeiting. Modi also said
that the ban would aid in the Kight against corruption and “black money” (i.e.,
untaxed black market activity).133 This was the third time that India had
demonetized large denomination notes. On the Kirst two occasions—in _j)m
and in _jah—the goal of reducing tax evasion Kigured more prominently in the
ofKicial justiKication for the government’s actions.134
The Modi government has said that the move led to a sharp uptick in
income tax Kilings,135 but independent analyses have questioned that claim.136
Disentangling the effects of demonetization from secular trends in tax
collections is difKicult without a control group. Our objective here is not to
defend demonetization but to illustrate the ways in which changes to non-tax
legal rules Kit into our framework.
Rogoff argues that the United States should make a similar move. 137 He
would begin by eliminating all notes from the XY, bill on up, and if that proves
successful, would proceed to phase out smaller-denomination bills as well.

See Vidhi Doshi, India Withdraws jcc and ],ccc Rupee Notes in Effort to Fight
Corruption,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
S,
ZOQd),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ZOQd/nov/OS/india-withdraws-WOO-QOOO-rupeenotes-eight-corruption.
134 See Amartya Lahiri, The Great Indian Demonetization, ^N J. ECON. PERSP. WW (ZOZO).
135 See S Murlidharan, Tax Returns Filing Sees Quantum Jump: How Modi Govt's
Demonetisation Exercise Has Started Bearing Fruit, FIRSTPOST (Aug. S, ZOQa),
https://www.eirstpost.com/business/tax-returns-eiling-sees-quantum-jump-how-modigovts-demonetisation-exercise-has-started-bearing-fruits-^ROdWaQ.html.
136 See, e.g., Lahiri, supra note Q^Z, at Wa; Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya S.
Khanna, Stock Market Reactions to India’s bc]k Demonetization, Qd J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. ZSQ
(ZOQR).
137 As Rogoff notes, then-Harvard Law School student James Henry issued a prescient call
for the elimination of oWO and oQOO bills nearly forty-eive years ago. See James Henry, Calling
in the Big Bills, WASH. MONTHLY, May QRad, at Zd; ROGOFF, supra note Q^O, at ZZZ–ZZ^ (citing
Henry).
133
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Rogoff argues that this intervention would reduce tax evasion as well as other
black-market criminal activity.138 At the same time, it would almost certainly
increase transaction costs for some cash-reliant individuals and Kirms—for a
period, if not in the long term.
The Legal Envelope Theorem provides us with a framework for weighing
the tax-revenue gains from demonetization against the transactionalefKiciency losses. Consider an individual who is roughly indifferent between
the informal and formal sectors: the additional cost of operating in the
informal sector (e.g., weaker protection of property rights) is approximately
equal to the additional regulations should would have to comply with and if
she operated in the formal sector. Now imagine that a small change in the
denomination structure—e.g., the elimination of X_,, bills—increases her
costs in the informal sector by enough that she switches some of her activities
over to the formal sector, paying more taxes. She is not materially better off or
worse off than before, but the extra taxes she pays are an increase in the total
resources available to society.
The Legal Envelope Theorem instructs us to weigh these beneKits against
other costs (and beneKits) of the rule change. If the change affects the
government’s administrative costs and these costs were not already accounted
for in the simple efKiciency calculus, the decrease (or increase) in
administrative costs would enter the calculus as an additional beneKit (or cost)
of the change.139 Note, though, that for a small change from a denomination
structure that satisKied simple efKiciency, the change in costs to banknote users
does not have a Kirst-order effect on the total resources calculus. The reason
for this is that a simple efKicient denomination structure balances the marginal
beneKit of fewer denominations (e.g., increased surveyability) against the

Id. at RZ–QQS.
No longer having to print a certain denomination banknote may reduce costs for the
government mint. On the other hand, having to print a larger number of low-denomination
banknotes may increase mint costs. And enforcing the demonetization rule might increase
costs for other agencies.
138
139

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3725155

68

The Legal Envelope Theorem

marginal cost (e.g., a larger number of banknotes required to complete a
transaction).140
The analytical framework is fundamentally the same regardless of the
details of the tax system, though—of course—the parameter values will
depend entirely on country-speciKic factors. The demonetization of highdenomination banknotes may be more desirable in developing countries like
India where the potential revenue gain is proportionally greater, or it may be
more desirable in developed countries like the United States where the
transactional-efKiciency loss from shifting toward noncash forms of payment
is likely to be low for most market actors. Our argument is not that the
demonetization of Y,, and _,,,, rupee notes was wise, nor that XY, and X_,,
bills should be removed from circulation (though we are certainly amenable to
that idea). Our more modest—but also much broader—claim is that all of these
questions can be assessed using the BETR and the Legal Envelope Theorem to
estimate the effect on society’s total resources.
+. Reducing the Cost of Financial Services
The cash example above involved a legal rule change that raises the cost of
transacting in the informal sector. Another way to reduce the size of the
informal sector is to make transactions in the formal sector less expensive (and
thus more attractive). One strategy for accomplishing this latter objective—
which we explore in detail here—is to change certain rules related to the
Kinancial sector.
The formal sector and the Kinancial sector are not synonyms, but they are
closely related. In many countries, banks share customer-related information

If the starting-point denomination structure failed to take into account the non-tax
negative externalities of cash transactions (e.g., the devastating costs of human trafeicking),
the effect on those externalities also would enter the total-resources calculus.
140
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with tax authorities.141 Firms that evade taxes thus must forgo the opportunity
to use banks. Apart from information sharing between banks and tax
authorities, banks may be reluctant to lend to Kirms that operate in the
informal sector and evade taxes, both because these Kirms tend to have less
reliable Kinancial information and because these Kirms are at signiKicant risk of
default in the event that their evasion is detected.142 Reducing the cost of
Kinancial services therefore serves to increase the opportunity cost of tax
evasion for Kirms.
To analyze the relationship between tax evasion and the cost of Kinancial
services, Roger Gordon and Wei Li propose a model of taxation in which only
Kirms using the formal Kinancial sector can be taxed (and only Kirms that pay
taxes can use the formal Kinancial sector). In developed economies, the value
added by the Kinancial sector is sufKiciently high that most Kirms choose to
operate in the formal, taxed sector. By contrast, Gordon and Li hypothesize that
in developing economies, the value added by the Kinancial sector is low enough
to generate a large informal sector. Gordon and Li use this model to explain a
number of otherwise puzzling policies consistently used by developing
countries, such as inKlation, tariffs, a narrow tax base, and government
ownership of capital intensive industries.143 For example, inKlation operates as
a tax on cash holdings, which causes Kirms to shift from using cash to using the
formal Kinancial sector (where interest rates compensate for inKlation).

Roger Gordon & Wei Li, Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a
Possible Explanation, R^ J. PUB. ECON. SWW, SWd (ZOOR).
142 Thorsten Beck, Chen Lin & Yue Ma, Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information
Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach, dR J. FIN. ad^, adW (ZOQN). Based on survey evidence
regarding tax evasion across countries, Beck et al. eind that smaller eirms are less likely to
evade taxes in countries where bank branch penetration is higher.
143 Traditional explanations for these policies are that governments of developing
countries simply did not understand which policies were desirable or that they were captured
by sectoral interest. Gordon and Li argue that because these policies are pervasive and longstanding, they are unlikely to be because of lack of information. Capture does not explain many
of the existing tax structures.
141
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Our particular interest is in the application of Gordon and Li’s model to
non-tax legal rules. Gordon and Li suggest, in passing, that if the government
can raise the return that Kirms receive from making use of the Kinancial sector,
it should do so, because that will cause some Kirms on the margin between the
informal and formal economy to shift into the formal economy and pay
additional taxes.144 Gordon and Li do not explain how the government might
do this, but the Legal Envelope Theorem offers potential insights.
Consider, for example, rules related to bank reserve requirements. While
capital requirements, discussed above, address the risk of insolvency (i.e., the
risk that the bank won’t have sufKicient assets to meet its liabilities), reserve
requirements address the risk of illiquidity (i.e., the risk that the bank won’t
have sufKicient cash on hand to satisfy its immediate obligations). Reserve
requirements specify the amount of cash that the bank must hold as a
percentage of deposit liabilities. A _, percent reserve requirement would
mean that a bank with X_,, of deposits would need to have at least X_, of cash
in its vault or in its account with the central bank.
Reserve requirements are typically understood to raise the cost of bank
deposits. Higher reserve ratios mean that banks must keep more of their
deposited cash in their vault, and thus cannot earn income from lending that
cash out.145 The beneKit of higher reserve requirements is that they reduce the
risk of bank failure. Some of this beneKit is internalized by the bank and its
customers, but some of the beneKit accrues to the rest of society. The failure of
one bank to meet immediate obligations may cause a run on other banks. A
series of bank failures can in turn produce contagion effects that impose costs
on other sectors of the economy. Bank failures also may impose costs on
taxpayers if the government steps in to bail out failed banks and cannot recoup
bailout money as part of the resolution process.

Gordon and Li, supra note QNQ,, at SdN.
See Charles W. Calomiris, Florian Heider & Marie Hoerova, A Theory of Bank Liquidity
Requirements Qd (Columbia Univ./Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper, Jan. ZOQW).
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Absent tax considerations, the simple-efKicient bank reserve requirement
would strike a balance between the above-mentioned beneKits and costs.
Wherever this balance is struck, the discussion here suggests a reason to
reduce the reserve requirement somewhat. This deviation from simple
efKiciency operates as a subsidy from other sectors (which stand to bear some
of the costs from bank runs) to the Kinancial sector.146 Importantly for our
purposes, it has the collateral consequence of reducing the cost of Kinancial
services, thus making the formal sector more attractive to Kirms on the
margin.147
To be sure, reserve requirements are not the only way that the government
can reduce the cost of Kinancial services and thus make the formal sector more
attractive.148 For example, an alternative policy—which is currently being
pursued in a number of developing countries, including India—is to subsidize
electronic payment systems. The Indian government has developed the
UniKied Payment Interface or UPI.149 The UPI provides a simple and secure
electronic payments system that is as cheap and easy as cash. According to
some reports, the UPI has been more effective than demonetization at reducing
the size of the informal sector, and it has much greater long-term potential.

The Legal Envelope Theorem case for adjusting reserve requirements downward
becomes even stronger if some of the social cost of bank failure is borne indirectly by the
informal sector.
147 Our analysis of bank reserve requirements does not necessarily apply to bank capital
requirements. Reducing bank capital requirements also may reduce the cost of einancial
services, thus causing eirms to shift from the informal sector to the formal sector. However,
reducing bank capital requirements also likely means that banks will shift away from equity
toward debt, which will reduce tax revenue insofar as debt is tax advantaged.
148 Gordon and Li note that if foreign banks do not share information with home-country
tax authorities, the government may choose to impose otherwise-inefeicient restrictions on
foreign banks so as to increase tax capacity. See Gordon and Li, supra note QNQ, at SWa, SdN.
149
See CASHLESS INDIA, GOV’T OF INDIA, UNIFIED PAYMENTS INTERFACE (UPI),
http://QdN.QOO.QdQ.Qd^/upi.html (last visited July ^O, ZOZO); Sasi Desai, Nipun Jasuja & Piyush
Khandekar, Your Guide to UPI — the World’s Most Advanced Payments System, MEDIUM:
WHARTON FINTECH (May QQ, ZOQa), https://medium.com/wharton-eintech/your-guide-to-upithe-worlds-most-advanced-payments-system-bNeOb^aZbfOb.
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In sum, legal rules can affect the choice of Kirms to be informal (taxnoncompliant) or formal (tax-compliant) both by raising the cost of
informality and reducing the cost (or, equivalently, increasing the beneKit) of
formality. Although these effects are likely to be largest in countries with
sizeable informal sectors, they have implications for legal analysts everywhere.
D.

Property

We end where we started, with property. Rather than review our initial
motivating example of changes to property rules in early-modern Europe, we
illustrate how property rules can affect taxation with another historical
example, the enactment of the Statute of Frauds in England in _maa. We then
turn to modern-day applications.
_. The Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds is incorporated into the law of every U.S. state other
than Louisiana. It typically requires that any conveyance of a property right in
land, aside from a short-term lease, must be put in writing and signed by at
least one of the parties.150 The Statute of Frauds also generally applies to
contracts that cannot be performed within one year151 and, under the Uniform
Commercial Code, to contracts for the sale of commercial goods at a price of
XY,, or more.152 It is taught across law schools both in property courses and
contract courses. We focus here on its property-law manifestation.
Over the years, scholars have imputed various purposes to the Statute of
Frauds: “to prevent people from fraudulently convincing courts that
nonexistent contracts exist,”153 “to caution the promisor that he is entering into

150

THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES SdO (^d ed.

ZOQa).
See Braunstein, supra note ZR, at ^RN-RW nn.NN-NW.
UCC § Z-ZOQ (Unif. Law Comm’n ZOQZ).
153 Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A Comment, QNN U. PA. L.
REV. QRaQ, QRSO (QRRd).
151
152
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a binding relationship,”154 and “to increase the security of property rights,”155
among others. The legal scholar Philip Hamburger, however, has argued that
the original enactment of the Statute of Frauds was intimately connected to a
debate in seventeenth-century England over the legibility of property holdings
and the collection of tax.156
Hamburger notes that fraudulent land transfers had become a serious
problem by the mid-sixteenth century in England. The medieval system of
preventing fraudulent conveyances relied on “a combination of community
ceremonies, rules of inheritance, and court rolls, which together often made
known who had title to land.”157 In some instances, the parties to a transfer
would conduct “a ritual known as livery of seisin,” in which “a twig or cloth of
earth would be transferred in the presence of local inhabitants.”158 Otherwise,
transfers were largely governed by the laws of primogeniture, whereby
property would pass upon the holder’s death according to mandatory rules of
inheritance that privileged the property holder’s eldest son.159 Some transfers,
but far from all, were recorded on local court rolls.160
Over time, these safeguards against fraudulent transfers “gradually
eroded,” according to Hamburger, most importantly because of the advent of a
new form of property called the “use.”161 A use—or what we would now call
“equitable ownership”—allowed one party to beneKit from land legally held by
another. As parties transferred equitable ownership informally without
relying on the livery of seisin or the laws of primogeniture, it became difKicult

Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions
of Form, N^ FORDHAM L. REV. ^R, W^ (QRaN).
155 Merrill & Smith, supra note QWO, at SdO.
156 Philip Hamburger, The Conveyancing Purposes of the Statute of Frauds, Za AM. J. LEG.
HIST. ^WN (QRS^).
157 Id. at ^WW.
158 Id.
159 See id.; A. W. B. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF LAND W^-dO (QRdQ).
160 See Hamburger, supra note QWd, at ^WW.
161 Id. ^Wd.
154
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to know who owned a particular parcel of land. This uncertainty generated
fresh opportunities for fraud.162
The most prominent proposal to reduce fraudulent conveyances was
mandatory registration of all land transfers.163 But a registry would do more
than just Kight fraud: it also would provide the Crown with information that it
could use to assess and collect land taxes.164 In the terminology we introduced
at the outset, it would enhance legibility. As Hamburger illustrates,
seventeenth-century commentators understood this point well at the time.165
For the same reasons the Crown supported a land registry, landowners
opposed it. A registry would reduce their independence from the Crown and
“would facilitate collection of the hated land tax, not to mention other forms of
conKiscation.”166 In addition, landowners feared having to justify their claims
to ownership on initial registration. Lawyers also opposed a registry because
it would have eliminated the rents they enjoyed from the legal work required
to limit fraud. Given the opposition by landowners and lawyers, the Crown’s
proposal for a registry could not pass Parliament.167
The English judge Matthew Hale’s idea of the Statute of Frauds was able to
satisfy both the Crown and landowners (and lawyers!). The core of the
proposal was a requirement that almost all conveyances of land be in writing
along with voluntary enrollment of transactions concerning land.168 Voluntary

See id.
See id. at ^WS-WR.
164 See id. at ^dQ.
165 See id. at ^dQ–^dZ & nn.^Z-^W.
166 Id. at ^dQ.
167 See id. at ^dQ-dW.
168 One might wonder why simply requiring a written document would resolve the
problem of fraudulent conveyances, given the ease of forgery. One important factor may have
been the limits of literacy: a signieicant portion of the English population still could not read
or write at the time, and thus would have had trouble conjuring up false documents. On
literacy in England over the last eive centuries, see Max Roser & Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Literacy,
OUR WORLD IN DATA (ZOQ^), https://ourworldindata.org/literacy.
162
163

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3725155

75

The Legal Envelope Theorem

registration rather than mandatory registration effectively threaded the
needle between the various interests in land conveyances.169 What the Statute
of Frauds did not do is centralize all information about land ownership in the
hands of the Crown such that the Crown could use that data to collect land
taxes.
To be sure, the Statute of Frauds does appear to have raised revenue—
albeit indirectly. By deterring fraud, as Hamburger notes, Hale’s system
increased the value of land, and thus expanded the base for the rickety landtax regime.170 To use our terminology, it was likely a move in the direction of
simple efKiciency, at least relative to the status quo. Increases in simple
efKiciency often will raise revenue insofar as they generate more wealth,
meaning that there is more that can be taxed.
The logic of the Legal Envelope Theorem would have favored the land
registry approach over the Statute of Frauds approach, because a land
registry—in addition to increasing simple efKiciency relative to the status quo,
also would have enhanced legibility. What is especially striking about the
Statute of Frauds case is that key actors understood this logic nearly three-anda-half centuries ago, though they deKied it because—at the time—they favored
a weaker state. Although the participants in the seventeenth century debate
would not have had the language of modern economics with which to describe
their insight, they—like the state-builders in Scott’s story—intuitively
understood the importance of tax-collection considerations in the design of
non-tax legal rules.
+. Modern-Day Analogues
Scott’s and Hamburger’s historical examples have parallels in modern
legal systems. Just as communal landholding structures in rural Russia and
Elizabethan England Klummoxed tax collectors, complex allocations of
ownership everywhere from the “pueblos jó venes” of Peru to the private banks

169
170

See Hamburger, supra note QWd, at ^dN-aR.
See id. at ^SZ.
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of Switzerland stymie contemporary tax authorities. The debate in
seventeenth-century England over land registration and the Statute of Frauds
Kinds analogues across the world today.
The Peru example is perhaps the clearest correlate to the controversy in
seventeenth-century England that culminated in the Statute of Frauds, though
the distributional dynamics differ importantly. There, it is in the pueblos
jó venes (literally, “young towns,” or what outsiders might call “shanty towns”)
where landholdings are often opaque to outsiders. The Peruvian economist
Hernando de Soto has argued that the prevalence of informal property rights
in these areas—such as the holding of land by squatters—makes it difKicult for
residents to obtain credit and to seek legal remedies for business conKlicts.171
Formal property rights would allow owners to borrow against their property,
to buy and sell the property, to assure protection against third parties, and to
otherwise obtain access to the legal system.
De Soto has led programs to give formal legal title to property holders—
Kirst in Peru, and subsequently across the developing and post-communist
world.172 While De Soto emphasizes the potential for land titling to improve
economic outcomes for low-income individuals, he also has noted the
important tax-collection consequences. He reports that when he and his team
set up voluntary land registries in Peru, the +ma,,,, formerly extralegal
businesses that registered their holdings paid an additional X_.+ billion in

HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (ZOOO).
172 See Hernando de Soto, INST. FOR LIBERTY & DEMOCRACY, https://www.ild.org.pe/aboutus/ild-president (last visited Aug. QO, ZOZO). Soto estimated that as of QRRa, there was oR.^
trillion in real estate held but not legally owned by low-income people across the developing
world and former communist countries—what De Soto describes as “dead capital” that cannot
be fully utilized. DE SOTO, supra note QaQ, at Q^W.
171
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taxes four years later. Studies of land titling in Thailand and India Kind dramatic
effects on tax revenue as well.173
Efforts to encourage land titling in the developing world focus on the lower
end of the income distribution. In many advanced economies, the emphasis is
on increasing the legibility of the holdings of the rich. Today’s governments
cannot readily observe who owns property that is hidden using shell
corporations, trusts, bearer securities, and other mechanisms of the global tax
evasion industry.174 One oft-cited study suggests that before recent changes in
the law, about h percent of household Kinancial wealth was held in tax havens,
and much of the resulting income evades taxation.175
A full analysis of the non-tax legal tools available to address the problem
of high-end tax evasion lies beyond our scope. But notably, one mechanism that
some jurisdictions have settled upon is the same solution that the Crown
sought in seventeenth-century England: a central property registry.

See Klaus Deininger & Gershon Feder, Land Registration, Governance, and
Development: Evidence and Implications for Policy, ZN WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER Z^^, ZNS, ZWR
n.QW (ZOOR).
174 Much of what we know about modern tax evasion comes through two major leaks:
one from HSBC Private Bank Switzerland, the Swiss subsidiary of the London-headquartered
einancial institution, and one from the Panamanian law eirm Mossack Fonseca. For a detailed
description of the latter leak, see BASTIAN OBERMAYER & FREDERIK OBERMAIER, THE PANAMA
PAPERS: BREAKING THE STORY OF HOW THE RICH AND POWERFUL HIDE THEIR MONEY (ZOQd). Academic
work using data from the HSBC and Mossack Fonseca leaks includes Annette Alstadsæter,
Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, Tax Evasion and Inequality, QOR AM. ECON. REV. ZOa^
(ZOQR), and James O’Donovan, Hannes F. Wagner & Stefan Zeume, The Value of Offshore
Secrets: Evidence from the Panama Papers, ^Z REV. FIN. STUD. NQQa (ZOQR).
175 Gabriel Zucman, The Missing Wealth of Nations: Are Europe and the U.S. Net Debtors or
Net Creditors?, QZS Q. J. ECON. Q^ZQ (ZOQ^). Other estimates are substantially higher. See, e.g.,
JAMES S. HENRY, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, THE PRICE OF OFFSHORE REVISITED: NEW ESTIMATES FOR
“MISSING” GLOBAL PRIVATE WEALTH, INCOME, INEQUALITY, AND LOST TAXEs (ZOQZ). For those keeping
track, this is the same James Henry who—has a Harvard law student—presciently proposed
the abolition of oWO and oQOO bills. See Henry, supra note Q^a.
173
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The Canadian province of British Columbia provides a case in point. In
+,_m, an investigation by the nongovernmental organization Transparency
International Canada revealed widespread tax evasion as well as money
laundering in the Vancouver real estate market. The tools used to evade tax
there are strikingly similar to those of seventeenth-century England. Wealthy
individuals—often non-Canadians—buy real estate through shell companies,
trusts, or nominees.176 These arrangements can be used to avoid real estate
transfer taxes, for example, by selling shares of a shell company or interests in
a trust rather than transferring the property itself.177 They also can be used to
avoid capital gains tax on home sales. Canadian tax law allows an exemption
for income from the sale of a principal residence,178 so wealthy individuals
selling investment properties sometimes appoint nominees who claim that
they use the investment property as their home.179
Spurred by high-proKile revelations of money laundering and tax evasion
in Vancouver, the British Columbia government moved in +,_j to establish a
registry of beneKicial ownership in land, with penalties of up to X_,,,,,, or _Y
percent of the assessed property value (whichever is greater) in the event of

TRANSPARENCY INT’L CANADA, NO REASON TO HIDE: UNMASKING THE ANONYMOUS OWNERS OF
CANADIAN COMPANIES AND TRUSTS ^Z (ZOQd). Nominees are individuals appointed to hold
property on behalf of a principal. See id. at QR. Nominee arrangements, also called “bare trusts,”
share some similarities with typical trusts, but the nominee’s authority is signieicantly
narrower than the authority of a typical trustee. See Douglas S. Ewens, Rosemarie Wertschek
& James R. Wilson, Income Tax Implications of Utilizing Bare Trusts, ^a CAN. TAX J. NRR, NRR-WO
(QRSR). Transparency International Canada revealed that Zd percent of high-priced properties
sold in Vancouver over the previous eive years had been nominally owned by students or
homemakers with no apparent income stream. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L CANADA, supra, at ^Q.
177 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L CANADA, supra note Qad, at ZR-^O.
178
See
Disposing
of
Your
Principal
Residence,
GOV’T
OF
CAN.,
https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/individuals/topics/about-yourtax-return/tax-return/completing-a-tax-return/personal-income/line-QZa-capitalgains/principal-residence-other-real-estate/sale-your-principal-residence.html (last visited
Aug. QO, ZOZO).
179 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L CANADA, supra note Qad, at ZR.
176
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noncompliance.180 It remains to be seen whether requiring registration will
prove to be enough to stop high-end evasion, though some local experts
express optimism.181 The key point for our purposes is that British Columbia
is very explicitly engineering its real property law in order to advance a tax
objective. The relationship between tax and non-tax legal rules, so often
shadows, is there in the limelight.
III. CONCLUSION
The fact that non-tax legal rules can facilitate or frustrate the collection of
revenue is not—to be clear—an insight new to the proponents of the British
Columbia beneKicial-ownership registry. Nor is it new to this article.
Participants in property-law debates three-and-a-half centuries ago grasped
the connection between non-tax legal rules and taxation. Indeed, one reason
why the subject deserves our attention is precisely because our non-tax laws
reKlect tax-collection imperatives. To understand how non-tax laws shape
society, one also must understand how those laws grease the wheels of tax
collection (or, in some cases, throw sand into their gears).
In an era of wide wealth inequality, the connection between non-tax legal
rules and tax-collection capacity plays an even larger role. The advanced
economies that have been most successful at closing the wealth gap are also
the ones whose non-tax legal rules best reKlect the Legal Envelope Theorem’s
lessons.182 Their experiences serve to underscore that how much we can

See BRIT. COLUM. MINISTRY OF FIN., LAND OWNER TRANSPARENCY ACT WHITE PAPER: DRAFT
LEGISLATION WITH ANNOTATIONS (June ZOQS), https://wwwZ.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/housingand-tenancy/buying-and-selling/land-owner-transparency-act-consultation/lota-whitepaper-june-ZOQS.pdf; What Is the BeneDicial Ownership Registry and How Will It Work?, REAL
ESTATE BD. OF GREATER VANCOUVER (May ZZ, ZOQR), https://www.rebgv.org/newsarchive/what-is-the-beneeicial-ownership-registry-and-how-will-it-work-.html.
181 See Kerry Gold, Armed with New Data, B.C. Set for Crackdown on Tax Evasion in
Vancouver
Property
Market,
GLOBE
&
MAIL
(Dec.
QQ,
ZOQR),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/real-estate/vancouver/article-armed-with-new-databc-set-for-crackdown-on-tax-evasion-in.
182 See supra note WO.
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redistribute depends in substantial part on how efHiciently we can do so. The
promise of the Legal Envelope Theorem is that it allows economic analysis of
non-tax legal rules to integrate tax-collection considerations into an efKiciency
framework. Some of these tax-collection considerations already are integrated
into non-tax law. But we believe—especially now—that there is room for much
more.
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